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CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE: A PERSONALITY RIGHTS PARADIGM FOR
PERSONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
JACQUELINE D. LIPTON*
ABSTRACT
When the Oscar™-winning actress Julia Roberts fought for control of the
<juliaroberts.com> domain name, what was her aim? Did she want to reap
economic benefits from the name? Probably not, as she has not used the name
since it was transferred to her. Or did she want to prevent others from using it on
either an unjust enrichment or a privacy basis? Was she, in fact, protecting a
trademark interest in her name? Personal domain name disputes, particularly
those in the <name.com> space, implicate unique aspects of an individual’s
persona in cyberspace. Nevertheless, most of the legal rules developed for these
disputes are based on trademark law. Although a number of individuals have
successfully used these rules in practice, the focus on trademark law has led to
inconsistent and often arbitrary results. Additionally, commentators have
questioned recent expansions of trademark law in the Internet context. This Article
suggests that if personal names merit legal protection in cyberspace, it should be
under an appropriate set of legal rules, rather than through further expansion of
trademarks. This Article develops a new framework for personal domain name
disputes based on the theories underlying the right of publicity tort. Unlike
trademark law, this tort is aimed at the protection of individual names and
likenesses. It has not been utilized much in cyberspace largely because of time,
cost, and jurisdictional disadvantages of litigation as opposed to the quicker and
cheaper, but trademark-based, Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(“UDRP”). This article suggests the creation of a new personal domain name
dispute resolution policy (“PDRP”) that combines the procedural advantages of
the UDRP with the theory underlying the right of publicity tort.
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INTRODUCTION
When Julia Roberts, the popular Oscar™-winning actress, brought proceedings
for control of the domain name <juliaroberts.com>,1 just what was her beef? Was she
concerned that the registrant of the domain name would be unjustly enriched by its use?
Or was she rather concerned about unauthorized content that might appear on the
associated website? Or both? She was successful in her complaint against Russell
Boyd,2 the registrant, in an arbitration under the Uniform Domain name Dispute
Resolution Policy (“UDRP”).3 But what theoretically was the justification for her
1

Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center (full text available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20000210.html , last viewed on November 6, 2007).
2

id.

3

The UDRP is a private dispute resolution procedure for domain name disputes that is administered
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”). The full text of the UDRP is
available on ICANN’s website at: http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm , last viewed on
November 6, 2007.
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success? The justification is actually found in trademark law.4 The UDRP was
implemented to protect trademark holders against the activities of bad faith
cybersquatters5 - those who register domain names speculatively to profit from selling the
names to “rightful” trademark owners.6
The UDRP is a global online dispute resolution procedure that is incorporated into
domain name registration agreements7 by reference.8 Domain name registrants are
contractually bound to submit to an online arbitration if a third party complains about
their registration or use of the domain name.9 Complaints are premised on the
complainant’s assertion of trademark rights corresponding with the relevant domain
name.10 The advantages of the UDRP over litigation are that it is inexpensive and fast,11
4

The policy basis underlying the result was that Julia Roberts had unregistered trademark rights in
her personal name: Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000, WIPO
Arbitration and Mediation Center (full text available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html , last viewed on November 6,
2007), ¶ 6 (“the name "Julia Roberts" has sufficient secondary association with Complainant that common
law trademark rights do exist under United States trademark law”). The UDRP is premised on protection
of trademark interests so individuals bringing actions with respect to personal names under the UDRP must
establish trademark rights in those names in order to bring a successful complaint. See discussion in
Landon Moreland and Colby Springer, Celebrity Domain Names: ICANN Arbitration Pitfalls and
Pragmatic Advice, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L J 385, 389 (2001) (“The first potential
pitfall in obtaining a favorable judgment under the UDRP is a celebrity’s failure to establish recognized
trademark rights in his or her personal or professional name.”)
5

ANNE GILSON LALONDE, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, at § 7A.06 (“Cybersquatters
register trademarks in Internet domain names with no intention of developing a viable web site but instead
to hold the name for resale to either the trademark owner or a third party.”) [hereinafter, GILSON LALONDE].

6

For a discussion of this practice, see Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: Taking Domain
Name Disputes Past Trademark Policy, 40 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 1361, 1369-1377 (2005)
[hereinafter, “Beyond Cybersquatting”].
7

Notably disputes involving domain names in the <.com>, <.net> and <.org> domain spaces as
well as some others. See introductory notes to the UDRP, available at: http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrppolicy-24oct99.htm, last viewed on January 23, 2008. The full text of the UDRP is also available at this
website.
8

UDRP, para. 1 (“This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has been
adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), is incorporated by
reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the terms and conditions in connection with a
dispute between you and any party other than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet
domain name registered by you. Proceedings under Paragraph 4 of this Policy will be conducted according
to the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules of Procedure"), which are
available at www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm, and the selected administrative-disputeresolution service provider's supplemental rules.”)

9

id.

10

UDRP, para 4(a) (“You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the
event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of
Procedure, that: (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights; and, (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the
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compared to litigation,12 and its reach is effectively global because relevant parties are
bound to it by contract, wherever they may physically reside. Thus, it has been the
avenue of choice for most domain name complainants.13
The problem is that not all disputed domain names correspond with trademarks.
Personal names, for example, may or may not be trademarked, depending on the
circumstances. UDRP arbitrators often have little guidance as to whether a particular
name really operates a trademark, despite regularly being required to make such
determinations. This has led to inconsistent and arbitrary decisions. Why, for example,
should Julia Roberts14 and Tom Cruise15 be regarded as having trademarks in their
personal names when the same is not true for Bruce Springsteen,16 or the late Anna Nicole

domain name; and, (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.”) (emphasis
added)
11

Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting, supra note ___, 1372 (“The UDRP is a private, international,
inexpensive, relatively fast, and predominantly online dispute resolution procedure for situations in which a
complainant is disputing the registration of a domain name. The UDRP does not oust the jurisdiction of
national courts. However, all domain name registrants are contractually bound to submit to a mandatory
arbitration under the UDRP if a complaint is made under the UDRP about the registration of one or more
relevant domain names. This dispute is managed by arbitrators licensed by one of the organizations
charged with hearing disputes under the UDRP. It involves the receipt of a complaint and a response by
the registrant. The arbitrator or panel then provides a decision and resolution based on this material. There
are generally no in-person hearings. The only orders that can be made under the UDRP are orders for
cancellation of a disputed name or for transfer of a domain name to the complainant.”)
12

Costs of judicial proceedings can be prohibitive for private individuals: Moreland, supra note
___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of celebrity domain names was an
expensive and potentially lengthy process.”); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet
Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 155 (2000) (noting the often prohibitive cost
of trademark infringement and dilution litigation in early domain name disputes).
13

Moreland, supra note ___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of
celebrity domain names was an expensive and potentially lengthy process.”)
14

Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ).
15

Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html).
16

Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan.
25, 2001, ¶ 6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It
appears to be an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that
in the case of very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving
rise to rights equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name
itself. It should be noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired
a secondary meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities
beyond the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music.
In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper
names of this nature.”)

4

CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE
Smith?17 Why should Senator Hillary Clinton’s name be recognized as a trademark18
when the same is not true for other politicians such as Kathleen Kennedy Townsend?19
The reliance on the UDRP to resolve personal domain name disputes raises two related
issues. The first is that the UDRP inadvertently encourages the expansion of trademark
law into questionable areas: for example, situations where an individual’s name is not
operating as a source indicator for products or services (ie as a trademark or service
mark). The second issue is that reliance on trademark-focused regulations for personal
domain name disputes appears in practice to have stalled the development of legal rules
more appropriately tailored for these disputes.
This Article suggests that these problems could be mitigated by creating a new
personal domain name dispute resolution procedure (“PDRP”). This new procedure
could retain the time, cost, and jurisdictional benefits of the UDRP, but be based on a
theoretical model more focused on protecting individual personas than trademark law.
The obvious set of legal rules that protects individual names and likenesses against
unauthorized commercial use is the right of publicity – or “personality rights” - tort.20
Marrying the substance of the right of publicity tort with the procedural benefits of the
UDRP is suggested in this Article as a useful way forwards. It would remove the focus
17

Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National Arbitration
Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at: http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving
annanicolesmith.com domain name) (“it is unlikely that the evidence submitted here by Complainant of her
career, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in the name, which is a
requirement for Complainant to prevail on this aspect of the case. While the UDRP does not require a
registered trademark for protection of a trademark from a confusingly identical domain name, the mere fact
of having a successful career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to
the use of a name under the trademark laws. The cases require a clear showing of high commercial value
and significant recognition of the name as solely that of the performer. The Humphrey Bogart case cited by
the Complainant is a prime example of the type of case that would be expected to prevail, since virtually no
one familiar with the movie industry would fail to recognize his name as that of a famous movie star. The
Panel does not believe Complainant’s name has yet reached that level of fame.”)
18

Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an
author of a number of books sold in commerce.)
19

Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html) (individual politician in state
gubernatorial race held not to hold trademark rights in her personal name).
20

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal
characteristics.”). The United States is the only country that has created a specific right of publicity tort.
Other jurisdictions may protect similar rights in other ways: for example, Trade Practices Act, § 52 in
Australia (prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct in commerce). In the United Kingdom, privacy
laws have been utilized to create a right similar to the right of publicity in practice: see, for example,
Douglas and others v Hello! Ltd, [2001] 2 All ER 289; [2001] 1 FLR 982, [2002] 1 FCR 289 (U.K.)
(concerned with compensation for unauthorized publication of photographs of the Michael
Douglas/Catherine Zeta-Jones wedding on a privacy basis in the absence of a right of publicity in the
United Kingdom).
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from trademark law, thereby avoiding undesirable extensions of trademark law into areas
where personal names are not truly functioning as trademarks. It would also facilitate the
development of a new jurisprudence focused on identifying and enforcing emerging
social norms in relation to the protection of personal names online, whilst balancing these
norms against the need to avoid chilling speech in cyberspace. Initially, a new PDRP
should ideally be limited in operation to <name.com> versions of an individual’s name,
as opposed to, say <name.net>, <name.org> or <namesucks.com>. This is because the
<name.com> version of an individual’s name is likely the most closely associated with
the individual’s “authorized” online persona.21 In other words, it is the domain name that
most closely approximates an individual’s persona in the domain space.22
Part I categorizes different classes of personal domain name disputes. It focuses
respectively on disputes involving celebrities, politicians and public figures, and private
individuals. It also identifies the limitations of trademark-based rules in these disputes.
Part II identifies ways in which personality rights jurisprudence is a better, or at least
more “honest” substantive fit for these disputes, albeit with inherent practical limitations
in the domain name context in terms of jurisdiction and cost. Part III presents a
framework for a new PDRP that draws on the substance of the personality rights tort,
while maintaining the procedural and cost benefits of the UDRP. Part IV presents
conclusions about ways in which a new PDRP would facilitate the evolution of a
personality-rights based jurisprudence in cyberspace, while removing disputes that are
not really about trademarks from the reach of trademark law.
One might argue that developing a PDRP is unnecessary because: (a) it would
over-propertize personal names online and hence chill free speech; and, (b) domain name
regulation is irrelevant because sophisticated search engines have taken the place of

21

Certainly most of the high profile personal domain name disputes involve <name.com> domain
names. See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving
juliaroberts.com domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving
tomcruise.com domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm)
(involving the domain name kevinspacey.com); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No.
FA0312000220007, National Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving annanicolesmith.com domain name);
Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007 (available at:
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the domain name
bjornborg.com); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html).
22

Some might argue that this was the intent of the <.name> domain space. However, that particular
domain space has not grown in practice in this way, and most personal domain name disputes revolve
around <.com> versions of an individual complainant’s name. See id.
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intuitive domain names as an Internet searching tool.23 Each of these concerns may be
rebutted. The suggested PDRP does little more in practice than is currently done by the
UDRP with respect to propertizing personal names. However, it does so in a more
consistent and appropriate manner – by developing a jurisprudence that is specific to
interests in individual personas as opposed to trademarks. It therefore removes from the
trademark arena those disputes that are not really about trademarks, while facilitating the
development of a more nuanced personality-rights based jurisprudence.24 Further, the
limitation of the PDRP, at least initially, to <name.com> domains should limit its impact
on free speech.
While it is unquestionable that sophisticated search engine technology has a
significant role to play in locating information online, the fact that personal domain name
disputes are still routinely arbitrated suggests that their control remains an important issue
in cyberspace.25 There are a variety of reasons for this. Even sophisticated search
engines use algorithms that prioritize domain names in search results.26 Additionally,

23

Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL
507, 548 (2005) (suggesting increasing sophistication of search engines will portend the death of Internet
domain names as search tools).
24

Trademark law has come under attack in recent years for becoming too expansive in scope,
particularly in relation to the use of trademarks online. Removing the need to assert trademarks in personal
names to prevent some inappropriate uses of those names in the domain space would avoid unnecessary
reliance on expanding the boundaries of trademark law in the personal domain name context. For more
general discussions of questionable expansions of trademark law in the Internet context, see Gregory
Lastowka, Google’s Law, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017536, last viewed on November 8,
2007; Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 507,
546 (2005); Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687,
1698-1699 (1999); Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark
Law, 92 IOWA L R 1597 (2007); Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L R 1669 (2007); Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Lessons from the
Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L R 1703 (2007).
25

See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May,
2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving
juliaroberts.com domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving
tomcruise.com domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm)
(involving the domain name kevinspacey.com); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No.
FA0312000220007, National Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving annanicolesmith.com domain name);
Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007 (available at:
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the domain name
bjornborg.com); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html).
26

See topranker.in, Search Engine Optimization, (“Search engines give top priority for the keyword
occurring in domain name in Search Engine Result Pages (SERP).”) (available at
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domain names have an important referential function. In other words, if I want to
recommend a given website to a friend or colleague, I will likely refer to it by its domain
name, and not by the search steps I took to find it. An intuitive domain name is therefore
still extremely important even in the age of sophisticated search engine technology.

I. PERSONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES AND TRADEMARK LAW
A. CATEGORIZING PERSONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
Different classes of individuals have differing concerns about the use of their
names in cyberspace. From past judicial and arbitral decisions, it seems that the major
classes of disputes involving personal domain names can be divided into three categories
respectively involving: (a) celebrities’ names, (b) politicians’ and public figures’ names,
and (c) private individuals’ names. These categories, perhaps unsurprisingly, match the
categories of persona protected historically by the right of publicity tort. The tort focuses
on rights in personas and has developed rules, admittedly somewhat disharmonized,27 that
at least begin to cater to the different needs of these different classes of people, and to
balance those needs against competing societal interests in free speech. The right of
publicity is not perfect,28 but could be used, with some tweaking, as the basis for an
efficient online arbitration mechanism for personal domain name disputes.

1. Celebrities’ Names
The most prominent category of disputes involving personal names in the domain
space revolves around celebrities’ names: that is, people who are famous for their
commercial activities in fields such as music,29 television,30 movies,31 and sports.32 These
http://www.topranker.in/important_seo_tips_for_domain_name.htm#seo_tips_for_domain_name , last
viewed on November 24, 2007).
27

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The publicity right is still developing and the
courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope.”); GRAEME DINWOODIE AND MARK JANIS,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY, 813 (2004) (“Most states have recognized
either statutory or common law rights of publicity. In the remaining jurisdictions, right of publicity claims
have not been asserted in recent reported decisions …”) [hereinafter, “TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION”]; Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J
383, 389 (1999) (“Existing practice [under the right of publicity] is … confused, with fifty state regimes
protecting differing aspects of identity, for varied terms, and with disparate remedies.”)
28

It is equally arguable that some other body of law from another jurisdiction, such as privacy rights
jurisprudence from Europe, or “misleading and deceptive conduct” jurisprudence in Australia (Trade
Practices Act 1974, § 52, Aust.) could be used as the substantive basis for a PDRP. The American law is
chosen here because it appears to deal the most directly with the kinds of disputes that are arising in the
<name.com> space. This may be because much of the celebrity industry is based in the United States,
notably California, and many of these disputes involve celebrity names.
29

See, for example, Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No.
D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20001532.html) (involving brucespringsteen.com domain name); Madonna Ciccone v Dan Parisi, WIPO Case
No. D2000-0847, Oct. 12, 2000 (available at
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people probably have the most commercially valuable personal names in the sense that
they trade to a large extent on their names and likenesses for their livelihood.33 However,
this kind of trading on a personal name does not automatically mean that the name
functions as a trademark. Trademarks are defined in the Lanham Act to include “any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof…used by a person … to
identify and distinguish his or her goods … from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods…”.34
A celebrity will not theoretically have a trademark or service mark in her name
simply by virtue of being famous. There must be products or services associated with her
name, and her name must be used to distinguish her products or services from those sold
by others. Nevertheless, celebrities have generally relied on the trademark-focused
UDRP to bring complaints about unauthorized uses of their names in the domain space.
This is largely because the UDRP is the simplest and most cost-effective procedural
avenue for them to take,35 even though it was never intended that the UDRP would
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0847.html) (involving Madonna.com
domain name); Experience Hendrix LLC v Denny Hammerton, WIPO Case. No. D2000-0364, August 2,
2000, aff’d August 15, 2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20000364.html ) (involving jimihendrix.com domain name).
30

Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National Arbitration
Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at: http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving
annanicolesmith.com domain name).
31

Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving juliaroberts.com
domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving tomcruise.com
domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No 114437, August 1,
2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm) (involving the domain name
kevinspacey.com).
32

See, for example Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007
(available at: http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the
domain name bjornborg.com).
33

However, there is some dispute about the extent to which they trade on those names in a
“trademark sense”. For a general critique of this point in the domain name context, see Anthony Verna,
www.whatsina.name, 14 SETON HALL J OF SPORTS AND ENT L 153 (2004).

34

15 U.S.C. § 1127. “Service marks” are similarly defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“The term “service
mark” means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal
register established by this chapter,
to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of
others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown. Titles, character names,
and other distinctive features of radio or television programs may be registered as service marks
notwithstanding that they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor.”)
35

Costs of judicial proceedings can be prohibitive for private individuals: Moreland, supra note
___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of celebrity domain names was an

9

CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE
inadvertently create a situation where personal names are recognized as trademarks in an
expansive and unprincipled way. While many UDRP arbitrators have accepted
trademark claims in personal names,36 others have not.37 It is difficult to ascertain a
principled distinction between the different approaches.
While it is possible that a “Julia Roberts movie” might be regarded as a product
involving a “Julia Roberts” trademark, this seems unlikely. Audiences may go to see a
movie because Julia Roberts stars in it, or they may associate a certain quality of
performance with Ms Roberts, but they are unlikely to regard Ms Roberts as the source of
the movie in a trademark sense. The movie studio that produced the film is more likely
to be regarded as the source of the movie. It is possible that Ms Roberts’ name is a
trademark or service mark when she sells her performance services to movie producers
and movie studios. However, this does not seem to be the basis on which UDRP
arbitrators decided that she had trademark rights in her name.38 There was very little
discussion of the point in the Roberts arbitration, other than the arbitrators
acknowledging that a mark does not have to be registered to attract the protection of the
UDRP.39 There is a suggestion in the Roberts arbitration, and in other UDRP decisions
involving personal names, that the name of an author of a creative work, such as the

expensive and potentially lengthy process.”); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet
Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 155 (2000) (noting the often prohibitive cost
of trademark infringement and dilution litigation in early domain name disputes).
36

See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May,
2000, ¶ 6 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ); Tom
Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot
Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0205000114437, August 1, 2002, available at
http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm , last viewed on November 8, 2007.
37

Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan.
25, 2001, ¶ 6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html); Anna
Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004
(available at http://www.adr-forum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm, last viewed on October 25, 2007);
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2002-0616, October 7, 2002,
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0616.html) (involving a
complaint with respect to the domain name <alberteinstein.com>); Gordon Sumner aka Sting v Michael
Urvan, WIPO Case No D2000-0596, July 20, 2000, ¶ 6.5 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html), last viewed on November 8,
2007 (“In the opinion of this Administrative Panel, it is doubtful whether the Uniform Policy is applicable
to this dispute. Although it is accepted that the Complainant is world famous under the name STING, it
does not follow that he has rights in STING as a trademark or service mark.).
38

Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000, ¶ 6 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ).
39

id. (“A recent decision citing English law found that common law trademark rights exist in an
author’s name. The Policy does not require that the Complainant should have rights in a registered
trademark or service mark. It is sufficient that the Complainant should satisfy the Administrative Panel that
she has rights in common law trademark or sufficient rights to ground an action for passing off.”)
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author of a book, may be regarded as a trademark.40 However, even if this test for
trademark status is correct, an actor in a film is not the film’s author.41 Under this
analysis, it would be more likely that the writer or director of the film was its author –
and therefore it would be more sensible to regard their names as trademarks in the
context of the film.42
Celebrities may have valid reasons for asserting some control over their personal
names in the domain space, particularly in the <name.com> space which is probably
viewed by most Internet users as the most likely site for a celebrity’s authorized online
presence. Celebrities may want to control this domain for their own commercial motives
– which seems reasonable, particularly if this is in line with current Internet usage norms.
For example, Tyra Banks’ management company, Bankable Inc, appears to have
registered the domain name <tyrabanks.com> precisely for this purpose.43 It is an official
website authorized and operated by Ms Banks, including details about her and her
career.44 Another example is <parishilton.com> which appears to be an authorized
website for Paris Hilton, including details of her proposed public appearances and her
recently released album.45
Celebrities may also want to control relevant domain names to prevent unjust
enrichment. In other words, celebrities who may not themselves necessarily want to
40

id. (“A recent decision citing English law found that common law trademark rights exist in an
author’s name.”). See also Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim
No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an
author of a number of books sold in commerce.).
41

Verna, supra note ___, at 162-163 (“If an author has trademark rights in his or her name, then it
must come from the rather singular nature of a novel. Yes, there are editors in the writing process,
however, editors do relatively little work compared to the author. A movie, on the other hand, has many
other people involved in the process …. Looking at the credits of any major motion picture, there are
writers, assistant directors, and people who need to operate the microphone and the camera. There may be
more than one scriptwriter. The actors and actresses are just a small part of the motion picture.”)
42

Although some people would disagree even with this analysis because of the collective creative
nature of a motion picture. See Verna, supra note ___, at 162-163 (“If an author has trademark rights in his
or her name, then it must come from the rather singular nature of a novel. Yes, there are editors in the
writing process, however, editors do relatively little work compared to the author. A movie, on the other
hand, has many other people involved in the process …. Looking at the credits of any major motion picture,
there are writers, assistant directors, and people who need to operate the microphone and the camera.
There may be more than one scriptwriter. The actors and actresses are just a small part of the motion
picture.”).
43

See http://www.whois-search.com/whois/tyrabanks.com, last viewed on November 7, 2007.

44

See www.tyrabanks.com, last viewed on November 7, 2007.

45

See www.parishilton.com, last viewed on November 7, 2007. Other examples of apparently
official websites run by a famous notable personality are www.donaldtrump.com and www.trump.com for
Donald Trump.
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make commercial profits from using a domain name may nevertheless wish to prevent
others from profiting from their name online. If we are at least initially limiting the scope
of a PDRP to <name.com> domain names this seems reasonable. It seems sensible to
allow a presumption that celebrities’ rights in the <name.com> version of their name
extend to preventing others from using the name to make a commercial profit from
Internet users who are actually seeking the authorized website of the relevant celebrity.
This would likely be the result in applying the right of publicity to a <name.com> case
where the registrant was making an unauthorized commercial use of the domain name.46
Unjust enrichment situations may be broken down into sub-categories. One subcategory might be where a domain name registrant seeks to profit from selling a relevant
domain name to someone else even if the registrant herself did not use, or intend to use,
the name. This is, in effect, cybersquatting on the domain name.47 Another sub-category
would be where the registrant seeks to derive a commercial profit herself from using the
domain name in an unauthorized way. Domain name registrants have, in the past, used
<name.com> domain names for websites selling advertising that is unconnected with the
celebrity in question. In other words, the registrant uses the celebrity’s name in the
domain name to draw custom to an advertising website that is otherwise unconnected
with that celebrity.48
46

In fact, a right of publicity action may well support such an action in relation to some other
iterations of the name in the domain space, such as <name.net> and <name.org>. However, these actions
are seldom taken in current practice because of the costs and jurisdictional issues involved in litigation, as
contrasted with a UDRP arbitration: see Part II.B.1 infra. This article suggests initially restricting the
operation of a PDRP based on the right of publicity to <name.com> names largely as a trial run to see how
arbitrators reflect emerging social norms in decisions in respect of the <name.com> space. If there was a
later perceived need to expand or otherwise alter the scope of the PDRP, this could be achieved later on in
light of developments in <name.com> cases.
47

However, in the absence of a legitimate trademark interest in the personal name, this conduct
should not theoretically run afoul of anti-cybersquatting laws, except for 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) which
does not require the plaintiff to establish a trademark in her personal name: “Any person who registers a
domain name that consists of the name of another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly
similar thereto, without that person’s consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling
the domain name for financial gain to that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such
person.”
48

Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006, ¶ 4 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (respondent had used
tomcruise.com domain name to draw custom to a website that advertised products and services unrelated to
the well-known actor Tom Cruise). Yet another example of a potential unjust enrichment based claim
would be a situation where a registrant is using a domain name in order to sell “vanity emails” that utilize a
celebrity’s name in the domain server part of the name: for example, <john@jimihendrix.com>: See
discussion in Miriam Claire Beezy, Good Marksmanship, 29 LOS ANGELES LAWYER 20, 23-24 (2006)
(discussion of domain name dispute involving the domain name jimihendrix.com in which the registrant
was offering vanity email addresses for sale including the jimihendrix.com domain); Experience Hendrix
LLC v Denny Hammerton, WIPO Case. No. D2000-0364, August 2, 2000, aff’d August 15, 2000 (available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0364.html ) (involving
jimihendrix.com domain name). If it is true that there is a presumption that famous individuals have some
rights to the <name.com> versions of their domain names, then the sale of such vanity emails by someone
other than the individual in question, or her authorized representatives, may be unjustified. This does not
necessarily mean that another variation of the vanity emails should not be permitted without the person’s
consent: for example, <john@jimihendrix.org> or <john@jimihendrixfan.com>. This approach thus
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Alternatively, a celebrity might want to control a <name.com> domain name to
avoid any authorized web content about her. In other words, some celebrities may wish
to control <name.com> versions of their names to telegraph to the public that they have
not authorized any web content about them. Thus, Internet users will find nothing
relating to the celebrity under the <name.com> name, and they will be aware that any
web content they find under other iterations of the celebrity’s name is likely to be
unauthorized content. In some ways, this analogizes to a kind of privacy protection
allowing the celebrity to communicate to the public her desire not to exploit her own
image online, and perhaps implicitly requesting privacy considerations from others.
Examples of this are found in the Julia Roberts49 and Tom Cruise50 UDRP arbitrations. In
each of these cases, the celebrity in question arbitrated successfully for control of a
relevant <name.com> domain name. Currently, the related websites host no content
about either of them. Again, such a result does not necessarily chill speech about
celebrities online. Many other domain names are available for fans and critics who want
to communicate about those people. Search engines will also help Internet users find
unauthorized content about individuals posted under less intuitive domain names.
The interests identified above in both commercial control of <name.com> names
and in privacy protections of a celebrity persona match the emphases of the right of
publicity tort much more so than trademark law. The right of publicity tort has been
explained variously on the basis of economic property rights in an individual’s name or
likeness,51 a need to prevent free riding or unjust enrichment,52 and the need to protect a
allows individuals to make expressive uses of their idols’ names without unduly interfering with
presumptions about what the individual may have authorized in cyberspace.
49

Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center (full text available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20000210.html , last viewed on November 6, 2007).
50

Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html).
51

Various justifications have been put forward for a property basis for personality rights, and have
equally been criticized over the years. For a discussion of property theory in this context, see Dogan and
Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for
personality rights as property); Mark McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67
U PITT L REV 225, 247 (2005) (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently similar to other objects the law
regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the traditional bundle of property
rights. But far too few courts and commentators have offered a theory as to why any of the traditional
property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications
for property rights in personal identity); Haemmerli, supra note ___, 388 (“Both proponents and critics of
the right of publicity generally perceive it as a property claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8
(noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that
commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to do so within this property context, and to
use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of a property right in identity or persona.”);
Roberta Kwall, Fame, 73 INDIANA L J 1, 15 (1997) [hereinafter, Fame] (“This Article … contends that a
property-based conception for publicity rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our
theoretical conceptions of property.”); David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property
Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71 (2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Eileen
Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr, Center for Social Change, Inc
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person’s privacy from unauthorized commercial interference.53 Personality rights
jurisprudence has also dealt extensively with issues of balancing the public’s interest in
free speech about a celebrity with the celebrity’s interest in controlling her public
persona.54 Although these are difficult issues that have not been definitively resolved
even within the right of publicity, this body of law has at least started to meaningfully
address these concerns and develop responses to them. Trademark law, on the other
hand, even the trademark laws focused on preventing cybersquatting, are not geared

v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1165-9 (1985) (describing development of a
property rights rationale for the right of publicity). See also Diane Zimmerman and Melissa Jacoby,
Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1322 (2002).
52

Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, at 1181-3 (critique of unjust enrichment
explanation of rights of publicity); Sarah Konsky, Publicity Dilution: A Proposal for Protecting Publicity
Rights, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH TECH L J 347 (2005) (recognition of unjust enrichment,
along with Lockean theory and several other theoretical justifications as explanations for the right of
publicity); McKenna, supra note ___, at 247-248 (critique of unjust enrichment theories of the right of
publicity); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81
CALIF L REV 125, 196-204 (1993) (critique of unjust enrichment rationales for the right of publicity).
53

Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1208-1210 (critique of privacy based
justifications for the right of publicity); Madow, supra note ___, 167-8 (discussion of privacy rights basis
for some early right of publicity cases); McKenna, supra note ___, at 285 (“Since all individuals share the
interest in autonomous self-definition, every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that
interfere with her ability to define her own public character.”), 286 (“Compelling a person to express a
message herself presents a particular sort of threat to her freedom of belief: It threatens her ability to
control what she tells the world about who she is and what she holds important …”); Haemmerli, supra
note ___, at 407-8 (describing theoretical muddle between property and privacy theory underlying rights of
publicity claims); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr,
Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1164-5 (1985)
(description of privacy foundations of the right of publicity).
54

Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 441-458 (analysis of First Amendment issues arising with respect
to the right of publicity); Peter Felcher and Edward Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ 1577, 1590 (1979) (“The First Amendment inevitably defines the
operation and extent of the right of publicity; once the defendant can establish that the expression in
question is protected, he will almost invariably prevail.”); Roberta Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the
First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 INDIANA L J 47 (1994) [hereinafter, First
Amendment] (suggesting a property versus liability rule basis for balancing First Amendment concerns
against right of publicity claims); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther
King, Jr, Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1172-4
(1985) (balancing First Amendment concerns with the publicity rights of public figures and politicians);
Madow, supra note ___, at 140 (description of the role of the consumer as an active and creative participant
in the creation of cultural commodities); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, at 46-7 (“We do not deprive the
owners of famous trademarks or the copyright owners of popular works of art or literature of their rights
just because the public has played some role in placing a value on these works. Therefore, right-ofpublicity critics must justify why the cachet of a person’s fame should be treated differently.”). See also
Diane Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35
(1998).
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towards such balances of interests. They are aimed predominantly55 at protecting
valuable trademarks against unauthorized commercial uses.56 Where trademark cases
have dealt with free speech, the inquiry has focused on balancing the integrity of
commercial source indicators against First Amendment concerns,57 rather than on
balancing the integrity of individual personas against the First Amendment. Personality
rights jurisprudence has developed responses to questions about balancing First
Amendment concerns against rights in individual personas.58 Thus, the personality rights
tort is more suited to personal domain name disputes than trademark law in most cases.

2. Politicians’ and Public Figures’ Names
Politicians and other public figures may also have concerns about the use of their
personal names in domain names. These concerns may differ in some ways from those of
celebrities, and may be valid to the extent that they do not unduly interfere with freedom
of expression in the political process.59 Again, trademark law is not a good fit for
55

The cyberpiracy provisions in 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1) are an exception to this as they are premised on
the protection of personal names against cyberpiracy and do not require the plaintiff to establish a
trademark interest in her personal name to succeed on a claim under the provision.

56

Outside of the UDRP, see, for example, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (infringement of registered trademark
by creating consumer confusion as to source of goods or services); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (infringement of
unregistered mark); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (trademark dilution through tarnishment or blurring); 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d) (cybersquatting in relation to domain names corresponding with trademarks), § 1129(1)
(cyberpiracy in relation to domain names corresponding with personal names).
57

See, for example, Mattel, Inc v MCA Records, Inc, 296 F 3d 894 (2002) (balancing expressive
interests of popular singers in using the “Barbie” trademark in their “Barbie Girl” song). It is worth noting
that some cases have dealt with the balance of free speech against trademark claims and right of publicity
claims in the alternative: see, for example Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994 (1989) (dealing with the use of
Ginger Rogers’ personal name in a movie title for a movie about two cabaret performers who imitated
Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire).
58

Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 441-458 (analysis of First Amendment issues arising with respect
to the right of publicity); Peter Felcher and Edward Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ 1577, 1590 (1979) (“The First Amendment inevitably defines the
operation and extent of the right of publicity; once the defendant can establish that the expression in
question is protected, he will almost invariably prevail.”); Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___
(suggesting a property versus liability rule basis for balancing First Amendment concerns against right of
publicity claims); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr,
Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1172-4 (1985)
(balancing First Amendment concerns with the publicity rights of public figures and politicians); Madow,
supra note ___, at 140 (description of the role of the consumer as an active and creative participant in the
creation of cultural commodities); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, at 46-7 (“We do not deprive the owners of
famous trademarks or the copyright owners of popular works of art or literature of their rights just because
the public has played some role in placing a value on these works. Therefore, right-of-publicity critics
must justify why the cachet of a person’s fame should be treated differently.”). See also Diane
Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35 (1998).
59

See, for example, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New
York, 987 F Supp 254 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan
Transit Authority and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (on balancing Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s
rights of privacy and publicity against the First Amendment); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for
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balancing competing interests in such names. Even if some famous celebrities, such as
authors,60 have trademarks in their names for reasons explained supra, politicians are less
likely to hold such trademarks.61 Most politicians do not use their names as source
indicators as required by trademark law. 62 Rather, they use their names to raise public
awareness about particular issues63 and, in the case of politicians, often in the context of a
political campaign. These names often have a temporal quality that is particularly
significant to the democratic process. If, for example, electors are voting on a particular
issue, a given domain name might be extremely valuable in the lead-up to an election and
much less valuable thereafter64 - both in the hands of the person whose name it is and in
the hands of others.

Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr, Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products,
46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1172-4 (1985) (describing need to balance First Amendment interests in political
debate against the publicity rights of politicians and public figures); Wilson v Brown, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 587,
589 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1947) (“One who takes an office, whether it is in government or in outside
organizations, must be deemed to have agreed to any reasonable public use of, or reference to, his name ….
Persons who accept high positions ought not to be so tender about the mention of their names; they must
bear “the white light that beats upon a throne.” If they want peace and privacy they should stay out of
public life; if they object to having their names legitimately mentioned they need only to resign and they
will quickly subside into happy obscurity.”)
60

Of course, where a politician is also an author, she may assert trademark rights in her name under
this analysis. See, for example, Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum
Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an
author of a number of books sold in commerce.)
61

Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com? Political Speech and the First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008); Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name
Process, Sept 3, 2001, ¶ 188, available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11,
2007 (“the names of political figures, religious leaders, scientists and historical persons may never have
been used in commerce and, thus, are unlikely to have trademarks associated with them.”). However, some
politicians have been regarded as having commercial trademark rights in their personal names in relation to
certain commercial activities: Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum
Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an
author of a number of books sold in commerce.)
62

See definitions of “trademark” and “service mark” in 15 U.S.C. § 1127.

63

That is not to say that celebrities do not also get involved in public interest issues – it is just more
typical of politicians in their day to day activities.
64

There can also obviously be temporal aspects to a celebrity’s fame. However, the temporal issues
can be more pronounced and more important in the lead-up to an election where election day is effectively
the deadline for a politician to get her message across to the electorate. The temporal issues in politics are
also much more significant to the operation of a representative democracy than temporal issues relating to a
celebrity’s fame which are likely to have more to do with the creation and waning of public interest in
cultural commodities at any given point in time.
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The kind of balancing exercise needed to protect a politician’s interests in her
personal identity against the need of the public to engage in discourse about her will be
different to balancing speech and commerce under trademark law. The First Amendment
is likely to be more seriously implicated in the political context than in the commercial
context.65 This is yet another area in which personality rights jurisprudence may be
helpful because of its developed focus on protecting different classes of individuals
against improper use of their names and personas. The right of publicity has already
developed rules for protecting politicians and public figures against certain unauthorized
intrusions,66 while at the same time promoting society’s interests in free speech where
these interests should override a public figure’s desire not to have her name or likeness
used in a certain way.67
65

New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 987 F Supp
254, 262 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority
and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (discussing continuum of protections available under the
First Amendment for political versus commercial speech about politicians in the right of publicity context).
66

Notable examples of right of publicity cases in which courts were concerned about the personality
rights of politicians or public figures include: New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority
and the City of New York, 987 F Supp 254 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The
Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (involving then New York
City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s public image in relation to an advertising campaign on city buses); Rosa
Parks v LaFace Records, 329 F 3d 437 (2003) (involving publicity rights of Rosa Parks in the context of a
song title using her name in relation to a hip hop recording that had nothing in particular to do with her or
her work); Martin Luther King Jr, Center for Social Change Inc v American Heritage Products, 694 F 2d
674 (11th Cir. 1993) (the estate of Martin Luther King Jr sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from
selling plastic busts of Dr King).
67

New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 987 F Supp
254, 266 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority
and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (“as a highly visible public figure Giuliani’s interest in his
privacy is very limited. One who chooses to be the Mayor of the “Big Apple” must expect that he will be
the subject of all kinds of public comments, even in advertisements.”) Of course publicity rights
jurisprudence is not perfect in the political context. It is disharmonized common law that has not yet had
an international reach: GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The publicity right is still
developing and the courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope.”); GRAEME DINWOODIE AND MARK
JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY, 813 (2004) (“Most states have
recognized either statutory or common law rights of publicity. In the remaining jurisdictions, right of
publicity claims have not been asserted in recent reported decisions …”) [hereinafter, “TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION”]; Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49
DUKE L J 383, 389 (1999) (“Existing practice [under the right of publicity] is … confused, with fifty state
regimes protecting differing aspects of identity, for varied terms, and with disparate remedies.”); Report of
the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, Sept 3, 2001, ¶ 173, available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11,
2007 (“Because of the diversity of interests affected by the treatment of personal names, the legal principles
and policies that can be deployed to protect personal names are similarly diverse and vary, as might be
expected, from country to country. These legal principles and policies include the right to publicity or the
right to control the commercial use of one’s identity, recognized in many States of the United States of
America; the tort of unfair competition; the tort of passing-off (conceptually treated, in many cases, as
part of the law of unfair competition), recognized generally in common-law countries; and the right to
privacy.”). Nevertheless, it is the most developed attempt at creating workable interests in individual
personas, and balancing those interests against the rights of the public to engage in discourse about famous
people.
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Politicians and public figures will naturally have some concerns about
unauthorized uses of <name.com> domains that mirror those of celebrities. An obvious
example is cybersquatting. A cybersquatter may well register either a celebrity’s name or
a policitian’s name in the hopes of making a commercial profit from its transfer. There
may be situations in which cybersquatting is more serious for a politician than a celebrity
in terms of practical consequences of failing to secure control of a given name. For
example, in the lead-up to an election, a politician will likely have a strong desire to
control a domain name relating to her personal name, particularly the <name.com>
version, as the Internet has become a very important tool for communicating with the
electorate and also for political fundraising.68
Like celebrities, politicians and public figures will also have concerns about
situations where a domain name registrant is not cybersquatting on a given name, but
rather wants to use the name herself for some expressive or commercial purpose. Where
the purpose is purely commercial, the right of publicity would presumably proscribe the
conduct on the basis that the tort prohibits unauthorized commercial exploitations of a
person’s name or likeness.69 Where the purpose is expressive, it is likely that the
registrant’s intention is to harm the politician in question. Given the temporal importance
of political domain names, particularly in the lead-up to elections, a supporter of a
politician would presumably not wish to keep the name from the politician.70 However, a
critic may well want to use the name to express views critical of the politician.
An opposing party or candidate may be highly motivated to engage in such
conduct. Because of the importance of free speech in the political process, these uses of a
68

Most politicians now run websites where supporters can donate funds to their campaigns. See, for
example, www.hillaryclinton.com (last viewed on November 8, 2007), www.barackobama.com (last
viewed on November 8, 2007). Senator Obama’s website has a rather sophisticated fundraising project
where individuals can set up accounts and set fundraising goals that they plan to achieve to support the
senator’s campaign – see http://my.barackobama.com/page/outreach/login/main, last viewed on November
8, 2007. Little has been written about the impact of the Internet on political fundraising to date. For a
survey of Howard Dean’s use of the Internet in his run for the 2004 presidential ticket, see Abigail Brown,
Politics, Innovation, and the Internet: A Source of Howard Dean’s Fundraising Success? (September 6,
2007) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1012481, last viewed on November
8, 2007) (examining Dean’s use of the Internet to set up town hall meetings for campaign and fundraising
purposes). On domain name use in politics more generally, see Matthew Coleman, Domain Name Piracy
and Privacy: Do Federal Election Regulations Offer a Solution?, 19 YALE L & POL’Y REV 235 (2000).
69

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal
characteristics.”).
70

This may be true of supporters of celebrities in many cases. For example, the registrants of
annanicoleamith.com argued in a UDRP that they had offered to transfer the name to Ms Smith’s
management at no cost to them: Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, National Arbitration Forum
Claim No FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004 (available at http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm, last viewed on October 25, 2007). This situation may be
contrasted with the recent dispute over various intellectual property rights allegedly belonging to the
popular singer Prince, who is now threatening operators of certain fan websites for their unauthorized use
of his image in their websites: see www.princefansunited.com, last viewed on November 7, 2007.
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<name.com> domain name raise important competing aspects of the need for the
electorate to communicate effectively about politicians. On the one hand, if all political
speech is to be protected, regardless of content or forum, then anyone should arguably be
entitled to register and use a <name.com> domain name about a politician for any
expressive purpose. On the other hand, if there is an expectation that <name.com>
domains will resolve to websites authorized by relevant politicians, it could be
misleading to allow even purely expressive unauthorized messages about a politician
under those domain names. Internet users could be misled in these cases as to the
identity of the speaker, and it could make it more difficult for Internet users to find
authorized messages by the politicians in question.
There are two recent examples of this conduct in Montana. One involves Bob
Keenan, a Republican candidate running for the United States Senate. The domain name
<bobkeenan.com> has been registered by the Montana Democratic Party and hosts a
website critical of Keenan’s past policies and practices. The second example involves a
Democratic candidate for Montana Secretary of State, Linda McCulloch. The Montana
Republican State Central Committee has registered the domain name
<lindamcculloch.com> and is using it for a website critical of McCulloch. Given the lack
of likely trademark interest in these politicians’ names,71 it is unlikely that trademark law
would help either candidate. The conduct would not even run afoul of the personal name
provisions in § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act (which does not require a trademark
interest) because technically the registrants of the domain names are not cybersquatters.
Section 1129(1)(A) requires an attempt to sell a domain name for profit for liability to
attach.72 The registrants in these scenarios are rather utilizing the names to communicate
messages critical of the politicians in question. They are not attempting to sell the names.
There is some state legislation in California that indirectly addresses this question
by prohibiting fraudulent and misleading conduct on the Internet in relation to a ballot
measure.73 This would likely catch certain instances of misleading Internet users by
registering a domain name similar to a politician’s name, particularly in the lead up to an
election. However, this approach has not yet been picked up in other states within the
United States, let alone at a more global level. In any event, it is not targeted specifically
at the protection of individual names from unauthorized uses, but rather deals with ballot
measures more generally.74 Thus, it would not apply outside the electoral context. There
71

Often, local politicians, as compared with some federal politicians, are not regarded as having
sufficient trademark interests in their names to support trademark-related actions. See, for example,
Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ) (individual politician in state
gubernatorial race held not to hold trademark rights in her personal name).
72

15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s
consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.”).

73

Political Cyberfraud Abatement Act, Cal. Elec. Code, §§ 18320-23.

74

Cal. Elections Code, § 18320(c)(1) (““Political cyberfraud” means a knowing and willful act
concerning a political Web site that is committed with the intent to deny a person access to a political Web
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is also some Californian state legislation that deals specifically with unauthorized
registrations and uses of domain names corresponding with personal names.75 This
covers all personal names, whether relating to politicians or public figures76 or otherwise.
However, again it only exists in California and is therefore probably not a realistic option
to address these issues at least in the short term.
The development of specific principles dealing with uses of personal names in
general, and politicians’ names in particular, under a new PDRP would be able to more
directly deal with the kinds of situations described here. Such an approach would also
have the advantage of being globally harmonized. Additionally, a PDRP would not be
limited to the electoral context, but would cover all politicians and public figures
attempting to use their names to promulgate messages on the Internet, regardless of
whether an election was looming at a given time. Importantly, it would take disputes
about free speech in the political process away from trademark policy by avoiding UDRP
complaints involving politicians’ names. The development of online jurisprudence
related to free speech in the political process should not be decided by focusing on
trademark principles where the conflict in question is not about balancing commercial
trademarks against the First Amendment.77

3. Private Individuals’ Names
Private individuals’ names are different again than those of celebrities or
politicians in the issues they raise in the domain space. These names are perhaps less
site, deny a person the opportunity to register a domain name for a political Web site, or cause a person
reasonably to believe that a political Web site has been posted by a person other than the person who posted
the Web site, and would cause a reasonable person, after reading the Web site, to believe the site actually
represents the views of the proponent or opponent of a ballot measure.”)
75

California Business and Professions Code, §§ 17525-17526. See, in particular, § 17525(a) (“It is
unlawful for a person, with a bad faith intent to register, traffic in, or use a domain name, that is identical or
confusingly similar to the personal name of another living person or deceased personality, without regard to
the goods or services of the parties.”)
76

In fact, there is specific mention of using a domain name corresponding with an individual
person’s name in bad faith to mislead electors: See § 17526(j), California Business and Professions Code,
including as a bad faith factor: “The intent of a person alleged to be in violation of this article to mislead,
deceive, or defraud voters.”
77

Nevertheless, disputes about politician’s names in domain names have been brought under the
UDRP in the past and the focus has been on establishing trademark interests – or lack thereof – in a
relevant politician’s name, rather than on the balance of speech interests in the political context. See, for
example, Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (In respect of a dispute involving the <hillaryclinton.com>
domain name, Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered trademark right in her personal
name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an author of a number of books sold
in commerce); Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ) (individual politician in
state gubernatorial race held not to hold trademark rights in her personal name).
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important in the context of this discussion than celebrities’ and public figures’ names.
There are significantly fewer disputed situations involving unauthorized registration and
use of private individuals’ names on the Internet.78 A number of disputes involving
private individuals’ names actually do relate to trademark uses of those names where a
name has acquired secondary meaning79 as being synonymous with the relevant person’s
business activities.80 Thus, trademark-focused laws, including the UDRP, will, in fact, be
appropriate avenues for dispute resolution in many of these cases.
Where a private individual’s name is not a trademark in the commercial context, it
is unlikely to raise many conflicts in the <name.com> space. There is much less profit to
be made by cybersquatting on non-famous names, and little reason to set up gripe sites or
parody sites about private individuals. However, one obvious example of where such a
situation might arise would be the case where more than one person shares the same
personal name and one person controls the name without the consent of the other.81 This
situation is analogous to the case where more than one company legitimately shares the
same or similar trademarks in different product or geographic markets.82 In the absence
78

Although there are some cases on record involving the names of private individuals: Paul Wright
v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002); Trudeau v Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS
7956 (2006); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003). All of these cases
involved personal names used in conjunction with businesses conducted by the complainant.
79

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or
trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection
only if it attains secondary meaning.”).
80

Many businesses, in fact, use their chief officers’ names as business names and trademarks: for
example, The Trump Organization (owned by Donald Trump). See www.trump.com, last viewed on
January 23, 2008. Of course, because of his participation in the television show “The Apprentice”, it is
possible that Trump’s name also functions as a celebrity name. Nevertheless, due to his business activities
(and perhaps also his authorship of several books), Trump’s name is likely a trademark. Trump has also
registered a variety of permutations of his personal name as registered marks with respect to particular
goods and services: http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe (result of United States Patent and Trademark
Office Search for “Trump” trademark conducted on January 23, 2008).
81

Ultimately, this was what happened in the paulwright.com dispute: Paul Wright v Domain Source
Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002). Although the plaintiff was successful in an action to have the
domain name paulwright.com transferred back to him by a defendant cybersquatter, the order was
conditional on no third party having acquired bona fide rights in the name. Another person called Paul
Wright had the paulwright.com domain name transferred to him before the court order went into effect so
the plaintiff never regained control of the name.
82

Stuart Weinstein, The Cyberpiracy Prevention Act: Reconciling Real Space Sectoral and
Geographic Distinctions in the Use of Internet Domain Names Under the Lanham Act, 9 U MIAMI BUS L
REV 145, 158 (2001) (“an entity may use an identical mark as another, as long as he does not use that mark
within the same sector or industry. As with geographical protection of a user's mark, the scope of protection
is determined as an evidentiary matter, looking at the likelihood of consumer confusion.”); David Barrett,
The Future of the Concurrent Use of Trademarks Doctrine in the Information Age, 23 HASTINGS COMM
AND ENT LJ 687, 689-692 (2001) (examining American legislative history of the “concurrent use” doctrine
in trademark law which allows different trademark holders to use similar marks in different geographic
areas); Dawn Donut Co v Hart’s Food Stores, Inc, 267 F 2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959) (holding no likelihood of
confusion in case where plaintiff and defendant used similar marks in different product markets and
different jurisdictions); National Association for Healthcare Communications, Inc v Central Arkansas Area
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of some kind of domain name sharing strategy,83 it may be that the “first come, first
served” rule has to apply here.84
More relevant to this discussion would be the admittedly less usual case where
someone registered one or more domain names relating to private individuals’ names
either in the hope of extracting money from those individuals for transfer of the names,85
or, perhaps more likely, extracting money for offering web hosting services under the
names. The first iteration of this conduct – the pure sale motive – sounds like
cybersquatting, but probably is not covered by trademark law because private, noncommercial personal names will generally not be trademarked.86 It may be covered in the
United States by § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act which does not require a trademark in
a personal name to support a cybersquatting action.87 The second iteration may or may
Agency on Aging Inc, 257 F 3d 732 (8th Cir 2001) (granting injunction against federal trademark owner in
order to allow user of the same mark to use it in established six county area in California); Jessica Litman,
The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149,
152 (2000) (“Out here in meat space, we can have a whole bunch of different owners of Acme as a
trademark - the last time I counted there were more than a hundred different trademark registrations, in
addition to all the local unregistered Acme marks you can find by just looking in the telephone book. On
the Internet, only one person can own acme.com.”); Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for Youtube and
Utube? Corresponding Trademarks and Domain Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008) (suggesting a domain name sharing mechanism for situations where two
legitimate trademark holders are asserting rights in the same domain name simultaneously).
83

Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube? Corresponding Trademarks and
Domain Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008) (suggesting a
domain name sharing mechanism for situations where two legitimate trademark holders are asserting rights
in the same domain name simultaneously); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark
Law, 54 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 507, 546 (2005) (“some domain names resolve to a “gateway page” (also
referred to as a “shared page” or “intermediate page”) for the sole purpose of allowing multiple trademark
owners or licensees to “share” the domain name through links on the page to their respective sites”).
84

Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 151 (2000) (“Network Solutions registered .com domain names on a first-come
first-served basis, just as all the Internet domain names had always been allocated.”); Stephen Moccaldi,
Do Any Viable Solutions Exist to Prevent The Exploitation of Trademarks Used as Internet Domain
Names?, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 179, 182-183 (1997) (“Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), a United
States business, controls the registration of internet domain names worldwide. Under the original
registration policy, NSI simply registered domain names on a first-come, first-served basis with no
requirement that the registrant actually intend to use the name in commerce. The method enabled domain
name pirates to register famous trademarks as domain names without ever using them in commerce. Many
pirates registered popular names and auctioned them off to the highest bidder. Trademark holders filed
suits against the pirates for trademark infringement, and against NSI for contributory infringement.”)
85

See, for example, Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002)
(involving the paulwright.com domain name); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613
(2003) (involving the schmidheiny.com domain name).

86

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or
trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection
only if it attains secondary meaning.”)
87

15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) (“Any person who registers a domain name that consists of the name of
another living person, or a name substantially and confusingly similar thereto, without that person’s
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not be cybersqsuatting depending on whether the registrant would be prepared to release
the name to the relevant person without receiving a profit in the event that the person in
question did not want to accept the web hosting services. If the registrant is only holding
the name in the hope of selling web hosting services and is prepared to give it up if the
relevant person does not agree, then it will not likely amount to cybersquatting.
However, if the registrant seeks a profit to transfer the name, it will likely amount to
cybersquatting and would be covered by § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.88

B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Before turning to ways in which the substance of the personality tort might
usefully inform the development of a new PDRP, it is worth briefly surveying the
shortcomings of the current trademark-focused options, in particular the UDRP. It may
seem counter-intuitive to say that the UDRP has shortcomings in the personal domain
name dispute context, as a number of celebrities and some politicians have used it
successfully in the past to gain control of relevant domain names.89 Ironically, the very
success of personal domain name complaints under the trademark-focused UDRP may
evidence a serious problem with the current system. The major problem with the UDRP
in this context is that it requires complainants to establish trademark rights in their

consent, with the specific intent to profit from such name by selling the domain name for financial gain to
that person or any third party, shall be liable in a civil action by such person.”)
88

One permutation of this conduct that is occurring with increasing frequency with respect to
personal names and other names, is where an individual has registered his own name as a domain name and
then accidentally lets the registration lapse. Some online businesses quickly register lapsed domain names
of all kinds and then try to extort money from selling the names back to the original registrants or to
someone else with an interest in the name. See, for example, Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002) (defendant registered plaintiff’s domain name – paulwright.com – when plaintiff
accidentally let it lapse and then attempted to resell it to plaintiff for almost $2,000). This is basically a
new form of cybersquatting that differs from traditional cybersquatting only in terms of timing. Traditional
cybersquatters registered domain names in a more anticipatory way: that is, the cybersquatter would
estimate what domain names would likely be valuable to “rightful owners” in the future and would register
those names in the hope of extorting money for their transfer. This new permutation relates to names that
have been valuable to someone in the past, and the cybersquatter hopes that that person, or someone else
with a competing interest in the name, will pay significant sums for transfer of the name, after its original
registration has lapsed. This conduct will be caught by the anti-cybersquatting legislation assuming that
second registrant – the cybersquatter- has no legitimate interest in the name other than seeking to make a
profit from its sale back to the original owner or perhaps to someone else with an interest in the name.
89

See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May,
2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving
juliaroberts.com domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving
tomcruise.com domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm)
(involving the domain name kevinspacey.com); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National
Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name).
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personal names.90 Personal names, like other descriptive marks, are only trademarkable if
they attain secondary meaning.91 The question as to whether a particular name has
acquired such a meaning can be quite a difficult one as has generally been left to the
courts within domestic trademark systems.
Asking UDRP arbitrators to resolve these questions raises several concerns. For
one thing, UDRP arbitrators, unlike courts, will generally not have the benefit of detailed
judicial precedent on the question of secondary meaning in front of them when making a
decision.92 In any event, they are not bound by judicial precedent. This has led to
inconsistent, and often arbitrary or superficial, reasoning in personal domain name
arbitrations.93 Secondly, the fact that the UDRP is the easiest and most cost effective
avenue for domain name disputes results in most personal domain name disputes being
90

UDRP, para 4(a) (“You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the
event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the Rules of
Procedure, that: (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in
which the complainant has rights; and, (ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the
domain name; and, (iii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.”) (emphasis
added).
91

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or
trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection
only if it attains secondary meaning.”).
92

Although complainants under the UDRP are required to assert legitimate trademark interests, the
proceedings do not require registered trademark interests, or detailed discussions of the nature of a
complainant’s alleged trademark interest. The Julia Roberts arbitration is a good example of how little
time is often spent on the trademarkability question with respect to a personal name: Julia Fiona Roberts v
Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000, ¶ 6 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (“A recent decision citing
English law found that common law trademark rights exist in an author’s name. The Policy does not
require that the Complainant should have rights in a registered trademark or service mark. It is sufficient
that the Complainant should satisfy the Administrative Panel that she has rights in common law trademark
or sufficient rights to ground an action for passing off.”).
93

Why, for example, should Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise be regarded as having trademark interests
in their personal names when the same is not necessarily true for Bruce Springsteen, or the late Anna
Nicole Smith? Why should “Hillary Clinton” be recognized as a trademark when the same is not true for
other politicians such as Kathleen Kennedy Townsend? See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell
Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving juliaroberts.com
domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving tomcruise.com
domain name); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National
Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at: http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm)
(involving annanicolesmith.com domain name); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National
Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html); Kathleen Kennedy Townsend
v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ).
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directed to UDRP arbitrators, rather than courts.94 This compounds the difficulties for
UDRP arbitrators because of the sheer volume of disputes in the personal name area they
need to adjudicate without the benefit of much detailed judicial precedent on the
trademarkability question.
This Part considers the development of trademark practice from the early days of
the domain name system through to the adoption of the UDRP. Its aim is to illustrate
how we arrived at a situation where the UDRP is, by default, the best available avenue
for personal domain name disputes, despite its shortcomings. Parts II and III then focus
on how an online dispute resolution mechanism based largely on the substance of the
right of publicity tort could improve matters.

1. Trademark Infringement
In the early days of the domain name system, litigants turned to existing
trademark law – trademark infringement and dilution actions – to protect their valuable
source-identifiers in cyberspace. The trademark infringement action95 protects a
trademark holder against an unauthorized use of the mark in commerce that is likely to
confuse consumers as to the source of a particular product or service.96 It was applied
successfully in early domain name cases involving trademarks on the basis that
unauthorized registration and use of domain names corresponding with someone else’s
trademark would likely confuse consumers.97
It was not often applied to disputes involving personal names.98 Perhaps personal
name litigants did not feel that they could support a trademark infringement action
because of concerns that they might not be able to establish a trademark interest in their
names. It may also have been that the cost of judicial proceedings in trademark law was

94

Moreland, supra note ___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of
celebrity domain names was an expensive and potentially lengthy process.”).
95

15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (infringement of registered trademarks); 1125(a) (infringement of unregistered
trademarks).
96

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 5.01 (the general aim of trademark law is to prevent
consumer confusion about the source of products or services).
97

Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(defendant’s use of plannedparenthood.com domain name for messages critical of the Planned Parenthood
organization was likely to confuse consumers as to the source of various services provided by the plaintiff);
Brookfield Communications Inc v West Coast Ent Corp, 174 F 3d 1036 (9th Cir 1999) (use of
“moviebuff.com” domain name by one video library was likely to confuse customers of one of its
competitors where each had some association with an iteration of the term “Movie Buff” in its trademark).
98

There are some notable exceptions of cases that do involve personal names and have been litigated
under trademark law largely on the basis of trademarks in personal names: Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F 3d
309, 320 (2005) (involving an intentional misspelling of the Reverend Falwell’s name as a domain name);
Trudeau v Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (involving Mr Kevin Trudeau’s name as a domain
name); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003).
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prohibitive for private individuals,99 even those most likely to be able to establish
trademark interests in their own names. This is probably the reason why most disputes
involving personal domain names have been brought under the faster and less expensive
UDRP.100 Trademark based actions can also raise jurisdictional concerns that do not arise
under the UDRP.101 The actor Kevin Spacey, for example, failed to establish personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in litigation for control of the domain name
<kevinspacey.com>.102 He then went on to successfully obtain control of the name in a
UDRP proceeding.103
Even in situations where the complainant is able to bear the cost of trademark
litigation and can establish a trademark interest in her name, there will be the problem of
satisfying the “consumer confusion” element of a trademark infringement action.104
Consumer confusion is the key to a successful trademark infringement suit.105 Many
situations involving personal domain names will not involve consumer confusion in the
trademark sense. It may be that a person is making unauthorized commercial use of a
domain name, but it is clear that the registrant does not represent the person whose name
is used in the domain name.106 This could happen where the registrant is simply using the
name as a “draw” to attract unrelated commercial custom.107
99

Costs of judicial proceedings can be prohibitive for private individuals: Moreland, supra note
___, at 385 (“Prior to the establishment of ICANN Arbitration, recovery of celebrity domain names was an
expensive and potentially lengthy process.”); Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet
Domain Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 155 (2000) (noting the often prohibitive cost
of trademark infringement and dilution litigation in early domain name disputes).
100

Moreland, supra note ___, at 385 (“ICANN Arbitration provides an inexpensive and extremely
quick means of recovering a domain name. In addition, celebrities have come to enjoy a very high success
rate in arbitration.”)
101

See, for example, Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024, ¶¶ 1-3 (2002)
(discussion of jurisdictional issues raised in complaint against cybersquatter’s registration of
paulwright.com domain name).
102

Kieren McCarthy, Kevin Spacey Loses Pivotal Cybersquatting Court Case, THE REGISTER, Nov
26, 2001 (available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/11/26/kevin_spacey_loses_pivotal_cybersquatting/, last viewed on
November 8, 2007).
103

Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0205000114437,
August 1, 2002, available at http://domains.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm , last viewed on
November 8, 2007.
104

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 5.01 (the general aim of trademark law is to prevent
consumer confusion about the source of products or services).
105

id.

106

There may be an argument that the right of publicity should not prohibit such conduct. However,
if there is something significant about protecting the integrity of individual personas online, theories of
personhood as well as property would come into play here, and they might support an argument for a right
of publicity action here, even if such an action would not arise under trademark law. On personhood
theories as a basis for the right of publicity, see generally Haemmerli, supra note ___; McKenna, supra
note ___.
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There would still be an open question in the celebrity cases at least as to whether
the misleading use of the mark was “in commerce” in the sense required by trademark
law. If the domain name registrant was not actually using the unauthorized website for
commercial purposes in the sense of selling any goods or services, the use of the name
purely to attract Internet users may not be sufficiently “in commerce” to support a
trademark infringement action. There is some case law in the domain name context
suggesting that any unauthorized use of a trademark as a domain name could be
sufficiently “in commerce” for a trademark infringement action on the basis that the
nature of the Internet itself is a multi-jurisdictional commercial communications
medium.108 On this reasoning, any use of a trademarked personal name in a domain name
could potentially give rise to a trademark infringement action. However, it remains to be
seen whether future courts would follow this line of reasoning.109

107

Such conduct could amount to trademark infringement under the “initial interest confusion”
doctrine or perhaps to trademark dilution. However, both these approaches to domain name disputes under
domestic trademark principles have come under attack for over-extending the boundaries of trademark law
in cyberspace. On initial interest confusion see, for example, Lastowka, supra note ___, 35-36 (“With
respect to search engines … a … significant expansion of trademark law is the doctrine of initial interest
confusion. Traditionally, and not surprisingly, most courts have focused analysis of consumer confusion on
the time period proximate to consumer purchases. The doctrine of initial interest confusion shifts the focus
of confusion analysis to a time prior to the time of purchase. Initial interest confusion can be found to exist
even if that confusion was not present at the time of purchase.”); see also Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest
Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L REV 105 (2005); Goldman,
supra note ___, 559 (“[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and
a uniform standard for analyzing claims. With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice
for plaintiffs to shut down junior users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”). On
dilution, see discussion in Part I.B.2 infra.
108

Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, ¶ 11 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (“Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must use interstate telephone
lines to access defendant's web site on the Internet. The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a
typical home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham Act's "in commerce"
requirement.”) See also American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“In addition, many of those users who are communicating for private, noncommercial purposes are
nonetheless participants in interstate commerce by virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain
access to the Internet by means of an on-line service provider, such as America Online, which charges a fee
for its services. "Internet service providers," including plaintiffs Panix, Echo, and NYC NET, also offer
Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee. Patrons of storefront "computer coffee shops," such as New
York's own CyberCafe, similarly pay for their access to the Internet, in addition to partaking of food and
beverages sold by the cafe. Dial-in bulletin board systems often charge a fee for access.”)
109

Gregory Lastowka, Google’s Law, 64, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017536, last viewed
on November 8, 2007 (“[I]t is not clear how Bucci had used the Planned Parenthood mark in commerce,
given that he lacked any product or service. Those who advocate for an expansion of trademark use often
criticize Bucci for this reason.”).

27

CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE
Of course, right of publicity jurisprudence also has an “in commerce”
requirement110 which may or may not be interpreted in the same way as trademark law’s
“in commerce” requirement in cyberspace. Whether or not this requirement is interpreted
in the same way for the right of publicity, there is a good argument that unauthorized
non-commercial uses of even a <name.com> name should not be proscribed under a new
PDRP. These uses may well, for the most part, be purely expressive uses that are
protected by the First Amendment. The balance of the First Amendment against
personality rights in personal domain names is considered further in Part III.

2. Trademark Dilution
Trademark dilution111 also has limited application to personal domain name
disputes because of its requirement of a trademark interest in the personal name, and
because of the time, cost and jurisdictional problems often associated with litigation.
Dilution differs from trademark infringement in that it is not focused on the prevention of
consumer confusion, and does not require a showing of consumer confusion on the part
of the plaintiff. Rather, it protects famous marks112 from blurring113 or tarnishment.114
Dilution at the federal level is designed to prevent people from creating “noise” around a
mark that might have the effect of lessening the strength of the mark in terms of its
capacity to identify the plaintiff’s goods or services.115 Thus, a dilution action could
prevent the sale of Sony potato chips as potentially dilutive of the Sony corporation’s
marks for audio-visual and electronic equipment.116 There is a non-commercial use
exception from trademark dilution liability.117 Additionally, under revisions to the
110

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal
characteristics.”) (emphasis added).
111

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).

112

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (statutory definition of “famous mark” as inserted into the Lanham Act
under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, H.R. 683 of 2006).
113

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (defines “blurring” as an “association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark”).
114

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (defines “tarnishment” of a famous mark as an “association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the
famous mark.”)
115

Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687,
1698-1699 (1999) (“Dilution laws are directed against the possibility that the unique nature of a mark will
be destroyed by companies who trade on the renown of the mark by selling unrelated goods, such as Kodak
pianos or Buick aspirin.”); GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 5A.01[1] (“Federal dilution law protects
famous trademarks from unauthorized uses that are likely to impair their distinctiveness or harm their
reputation. It enables owners of those marks to maintain their value as source indicators and as symbols of
good will. While the law benefits only famous trademarks, it adds a potent weapon against the whittling
away of the hard-to-measure distinctive quality of those marks.”)
116

id.

117

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).
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Lanham Act in 2006,118 there is an expanded fair use defense that contemplates various
forms of commentary on a trademark holder as a defense to the action.119
Trademark dilution actions were used successfully by trademark holders in the
early days of the domain name system.120 These actions were particularly effective in
cases involving cybersquatters.121 This is because the use of someone else’s trademark in
a domain name for no particular purpose other than to sell the name to the trademark
holder – or perhaps to a competitor of the trademark holder – could be said to be creating
noise around the mark in the dilution sense. Early courts held that a domain name
corresponding to a trademark is integral to a business’ ability to engage in commerce on
the Internet such that cybersquatting on such a name would be prohibited as interfering
with this ability.122
However, a dilution action requires that the plaintiff establish not only a
trademark interest, but that she holds a famous mark.123 Despite the fact that it has
historically been reasonably easy in practice for commercial plaintiffs to establish that
their mark is sufficiently famous to bring a dilution action,124 this may not be the case
with respect to personal names. Personal names are often not trademarks at all, even with
respect to some rather well-known celebrities.125 Recent amendments to the federal
118

Trademark Dilution Revision Act, H.R. 683 of 2006 (“TDRA”).

119

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).

120

See, for example, Panavision Int’l L.P. v Toeppen, 141 F 3d 1316 (9th Cir 1998) (successful
trademark dilution action against cybersquatter who was not using the name for any purpose other than
attempting to sell it to the corresponding trademark holder).
121

id.

122

id., 1327 (“We reject [defendant’s] premise that a domain name is nothing more than an address.
A significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity that owns the web site.”), 1327
(“[Defendant’s] use of Panavision.com also puts Panavision's name and reputation at his mercy.”)
123

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (“Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another
person who, at any time after the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual
economic injury.”). “Famous mark” is now defined for these purposes in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
124

Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L J 1687,
1698-1699 (1999). However, since the enactment of the TDRA in 2006, it may be more difficult to
establish that a mark is famous than in the past due to the new definition of “famous mark” now inserted
into 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). At least courts may have to undertake an analysis of whether a mark is
famous or not with regard to this provision.
125

See, for example, Moreland, supra note ___, at 390 (comparing UDRP arbitrations where
celebrities have not been able to establish trademark rights in their personal names); Bruce Springsteen v
Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001, ¶ 6 (available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It appears to be an established
principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the case of very well

29

CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE
dilution statute may make it more difficult for individuals, even famous individuals, to
establish that their personal names operate as famous marks. The new definition of
“famous mark” inserted into the Lanham Act in October 2006 contemplates the notion of
a famous mark in very consumer-oriented terms with respect to the source of goods or
services.126 Many famous individual’s names will not, in fact, operate in this way. Thus,
it may be more difficult in theory at least for a plaintiff to establish trademark dilution
with respect to a personal name than even to establish trademark infringement.
Celebrities to one side, presumably most politicians, public figures and private
individuals will not be able to show marks at all, or at least marks with sufficient fame, to
bring a successful dilution action. This coupled with the costs of litigation make a
trademark dilution action an inappropriate and unlikely avenue for the future resolution
of personal domain name disputes.

3. The Anti-Cybersqsuatting Consumer Protection Act, and California’s
Business and Professions Code
The ACPA was enacted in 1999 to address some of the specific concerns of
trademark holders in relation to cybersquatting. It is focused on protecting trademarks in
cyberspace, although it does make some specific provision for personal names – the only
law to have done so in the Internet context. The ACPA inserted two new provisions into
known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to rights equating to
unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name itself. It should be noted that
no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired a secondary meaning; in
other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities beyond the primary activities
of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music. In the view of this Panel, it is
by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of this nature.”); Anna
Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004
(available at http://www.adr-forum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm), last viewed on October 25, 2007
(“it is unlikely that the evidence submitted here by the Complainant of her career, in and of itself, is
sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in the name, which is a requirement for Complainant
to prevail on this aspect of the case. While the UDRP does not require a registered trademark for
protection of a trademark from a confusingly identical domain name, the mere fact of having a successful
career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to the use of a name under
the trademark laws.”); Gordon Sumner aka Sting v Michael Urvan, WIPO Case No D2000-0596, July 20,
2000, ¶ 6.5 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html), last
viewed on November 8, 2007 (“In the opinion of this Administrative Panel, it is doubtful whether the
Uniform Policy is applicable to this dispute. Although it is accepted that the Complainant is world famous
under the name STING, it does not follow that he has rights in STING as a trademark or service mark.
Unlike the personal names in issue in the cases Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, Jeannette Winterson v
Mark Hogarth, and Steven Rattner v BuyThisDomainName (John Pepin), the personal name in this case is
also a common word in the English language, with a number of different meanings.”)
126

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (“For purposes of paragraph [15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)], a mark is
famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of
source of the goods or services of the mark's owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite
degree of recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The duration,
extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by
the owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services
offered under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark…”)
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the Lanham Act – one directed at the prevention of cybersquatting with respect to
trademarks,127 and the other directed at the prevention of cybersquatting with respect to
personal names.128 Both provisions prohibit the registration of a domain name with a bad
faith profit motive129 where there is no other legitimate purpose for using the name.130 The
trademark-focused provision is of limited use to personal name holders again because
many personal names will not be trademarks.131 However, the personal name provision § 1129(1)(A) - is available to people who are concerned about cybersquatters registering
their names as domain names.132 This should provide some comfort to those concerned
about having to pay exorbitant sums of money for return of a name that should
“rightfully” be theirs. However, interestingly, the provision has not been utilized much in
practice, particularly in comparison with the UDRP.133 This is probably because the
UDRP is faster and cheaper,134 even though it is premised on the existence of a trademark
interest.

127

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

128

15 U.S.C. § 1129(1).

129

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii) prohibits registering, trafficking, or using a domain name in bad
faith for a profit while § 1129(1)(A) contemplates an attempted sale of the name in bad faith.
130

15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(i), 1129(1)(A).

131

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.03[4][d] (“Just as with descriptive terms, a trademark or
trade name that consists of a personal name (first name, surname, or both) is entitled to legal protection
only if it attains secondary meaning.”).
132

Examples of cases where this section was argued in situations involving cybersquatting on
personal names include: Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002)
(successful action under 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) with respect to the paulwright.com domain name);
Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003) (successful action under § 1129(1) of the
Lanham Act for transfer of the schmidheiny.com domain name to the plaintiff, Mr Schmidheiny, and
injunction against the defendant registering any further iterations of the plaintiff’s name as a domain name).
Note also discussion of these provisions by UDRP arbitrator in Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO
Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html) (“The Panel finds that the
protection of an individual politician's name, no matter how famous, is outside the scope of the Policy since
it is not connected with commercial exploitation as set out in the Second WIPO Report. This does not
mean that Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains express provisions protecting the rights in
personal names. Complainant is free to pursue her claims in that forum. And, as mentioned, the committee
may have rights in the marks that are sufficiently commercial as to entitle the committee to protection
under the Policy.”)
133

Moreland, supra note ___, at 386 (noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name
disputes under the UDRP, and citing Statistical Summary for Proceedings under the Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (February 26, 2001), 394 (“A plethora of disputes involving personal
names have been submitted to ICANN Arbitration.”)).
134

Moreland, supra note ___, at 385 (“ICANN Arbitration provides an inexpensive and extremely
quick means of recovering a domain name.”)
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One significant limitation of the ACPA is that it does not cover situations where
the registrant is not a cybersquatter, but is using a domain name for some other purpose
which may be commercial, or may be expressive, or may be a combination of both.135
Some registrants of <name.com> names will use them to attract commercial custom
through advertising, for example. If they can make more money by doing this than by
selling the name, they will not be a cybersquatter under § 1129(1)(A). Unauthorized uses
of personal domain names for purely expressive purposes raise more difficult policy
questions. Should there be an overriding presumption that <name.com> names in
particular “rightfully” belong to people with corresponding names, regardless of the use a
registrant is making of the domain name? Such a presumption may well trample on First
Amendment concerns where the registrant’s use of the name is purely expressive.
Issues of the First Amendment versus the rights of trademark holders have arisen
already in trademark disputes that do not involve personal names: for example, some
UDRP arbitrators have suggested that legitimate commentary about a trademark holder
should be protected on the Internet.136 This might include allowing an unauthorized use
of a domain name that corresponds in some way with a registered trademark for, say, a
gripe site about the trademark holder.137 However, judges and arbitrators in the
trademark context have not generally accepted that commentators should be allowed to
utilize the most intuitive domain name corresponding to the trademark – that is, the
<trademark.com> version of the name.138 They have been relegated to “lesser” forms of
135

Beezy, supra note ___, at 24 (“the distinction between cybersquatter and cybergriper – that is, the
difference between bad faith registration and use of a domain name that incorporates another’s mark and
permissible registration and use, albeit unauthorized, of another’s mark – will become difficult to
discern.”).
136

Bridgestone Firestone v Myers, WIPO Case No, D2000-0190, July 6, 2000, (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html) (“Although free speech is not
listed as one of the [UDRP’s] examples of a right or legitimate interest in a domain name, the list is not
exclusive, and the Panel concludes that the exercise of free speech for criticism and commentary …
demonstrates a right or legitimate interest in the domain name under Paragraph 4(c)(iii). The Internet is
above all a framework for global communication, and the right to free speech should be one of the
foundations of Internet law.”).
137

id. There is some judicial authority suggesting the same thing: Bosley v Kremer, 403 F 3d 672,
679-80 (9th Cir., 2005) (“Kremer is not Bosley's competitor; he is their critic. His use of the Bosley mark is
not in connection with a sale of goods or services - it is in connection with the expression of his opinion
about Bosley's goods and services. The dangers that the Lanham Act was designed to address are simply
not at issue in this case. The Lanham Act ... does not prohibit all unauthorized uses of a trademark ... . Any
harm to Bosley arises not from a competitor's sale of a similar product under Bosley's mark, but from
Kremer's criticism of their services. Bosley cannot use the Lanham Act either as a shield from Kremer's
criticism or as a sword to shut Kremer up.”)
138

Bridgestone Firestone v Myers, WIPO Case No, D2000-0190, July 6, 2000, (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html) (“In the cybersquatting cases,
the domain names in question generally were www.trademark.com domain names, which prevented the
trademark holder from utilizing the customary commercial domain name for its “official” site …. Here,
however, the domain name registrant has not usurped the <.com> domain, but has utilized only the <.net>
domain, has posted disclaimers on the website homepage, and has included criticism or commentary on the
site so that a reasonably prudent Internet user can tell that the site is not the trademark holder’s “official”
site.”).
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the domain name, such as those using a different generic Top Level Domain (“gTLD”)
such as <.org> or <.net>, or those using a “qualifier” at the end of the domain, such as
<trademarksucks.com>.139 On this analogy, there perhaps is, or should be, a presumption
that well known people such as celebrities and public figures do have rights to the
<name.com> versions of their names if this is an identifiable Internet usage norm. If this
presumption is correct, the ACPA will not assist with its development or enforcement
because of its focus on cybersquatting, as opposed to web commentary.
Interestingly, one state – California – has experimented with legislation directed
at personal name cybersquatting. The relevant provisions can be found in §§ 1752517526 of California’s Business and Professions Code. Section 17525(a) provides that:
It is unlawful for a person, with a bad faith intent to register,
traffic in, or use a domain name, that is identical or confusingly
similar to the personal name of another living person or deceased
personality, without regard to the goods or services of the parties.
This legislation is broader than § 1129(1)(A) of the Lanham Act in that it
contemplates deceased as well as living persons and that it includes a list of “bad faith
factors” that are somewhat broader than those in § 1129(1)(A). The Californian
legislation also includes as a bad faith factor an intention on the part of the registrant to
“mislead, deceive, or defraud voters.”140 This may be relevant to situations where a
politician is complaining about unauthorized use of her name in a corresponding domain
name, at least if the use of the name is misleading or fraudulent in some way.141
However, it is an open question as to whether the legislation would, or indeed should,
cover pure political gripe sites, such as the <bobkeenan.com> and <lindamcculloch.com>
examples described in Part I.A.2. This is because a legitimate criticism of a politician
may not be regarded as misleading, deceiving or defrauding voters, provided it is clear
from the context that these websites are not endorsed by the politician in question. On
the other hand, if the view is taken that using a <name.com> domain name for a website
other than that authorized by the person in question is automatically a misleading use of
the name because Internet users would expect the domain name to resolve to an

139

Although, some arbitrators have held that even domain names employing pejorative qualifiers
should be in the control of the trademark holder rather than anyone else. See, for example, Societe Air
France v. Virtual Dates, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0168 (WIPO Arb. and Mediation Ctr., Admin. Panel
Decision, May 24, 2005), available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/ 2005/d20050168.html (majority panelists decided that airfrancesucks.com domain name should be transferred to the
trademark holder and ought not be controlled by a gripe site operator).
140

California Business and Professions Code, § 17526(j).

141

On this point, see also Cal. Elections Code, § 18320 which prohibits certain activities described as
“political cyberfraud”. This legislation, although not specifically targeted at personal name protection, may
have the same results in practice as the Business and Professions Code with respect to some uses of
politician’s names in the lead-up to elections. For a more general discussion of the operation of both
Californian statutes in the political domain name context, see Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com?
Political Speech and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008).
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authorized website, then the section might have some application. Time will tell whether,
and how effectively, these provisions are utilized in practice.

4. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
This brings us back to the most popular avenue for personal domain name
disputes142 – the UDRP – which was adopted at the same time that the ACPA was
enacted. The UDRP is global in jurisdictional scope because of its incorporation into
relevant143 domain name registration agreements.144 It thus does away with some of the
jurisdictional problems inherent in both trademark and personality rights based
litigation.145 Again, the UDRP is aimed at preventing cybersquatting over trademarks.146
The two major hurdles for a personal domain name complainants under the UDRP are
that: (a) a trademark must be established in the personal name, and (b) the UDRP will
only apply to cybersquatting.147 The UDRP contains a specific defense for domain name
142

Beezy, supra note ___, at 23-24 (noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name
proceedings under the UDRP and surveying some of the recent decisions); Moreland, supra note ___, at
386 (noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name disputes under the UDRP, and citing
Statistical Summary for Proceedings under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
(February 26, 2001), 394 (“A plethora of disputes involving personal names have been submitted to
ICANN Arbitration.”))
143

ICANN, UDRP Notes, Note 2, available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm,
last viewed on November 10, 2007, (“This policy has been adopted by all accredited domain-name
registrars for domain names ending in .com, .net, and .org. It has also been adopted by certain managers of
country-code top-level domains (e.g., .nu, .tv, .ws).”)
144

UDRP, clause 1 (“This Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy") has been
adopted by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), is incorporated by
reference into your Registration Agreement, and sets forth the terms and conditions in connection with a
dispute between you and any party other than us (the registrar) over the registration and use of an Internet
domain name registered by you.”)
145

See, for example, Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024, ¶¶ 1-3 (2002)
(discussion of jurisdictional issues raised in complaint against cybersquatter’s registration of
paulwright.com domain name). The movie actor Kevin Spacey was also initially unsuccessful in a
cybersquatting claim against the registrant of kevinspacey.com on jurisdictional grounds, but later
succeeded under a UDRP proceeding: Kieren McCarthy, Kevin Spacey Loses Pivotal Cybersquatting
Court Case, THE REGISTER, Nov 26, 2001 (available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/11/26/kevin_spacey_loses_pivotal_cybersquatting/, last viewed on
November 8, 2007). For completeness, it should also be noted that the ACPA contains some in rem
provisions to simplify jurisdictional issues for actions taken under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1). See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d)(2).
146

UDRP, clause 4(a)(i) (“You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in
the event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in compliance with the
Rules of Procedure, that (i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service
mark in which the complainant has rights…”)
147

Beezy, supra note ___, at 24 (“the distinction between cybersquatter and cybergriper – that is, the
difference between bad faith registration and use of a domain name that incorporates another’s mark and
permissible registration and use, albeit unauthorized, of another’s mark – will become difficult to
discern.”); Moreland, supra note ___, at 390-2 (noting that the UDRP will not assist a complainant where a
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registrants making a “legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the relevant domain
name”.148 It has not been clear what will constitute “fair use” in this context, although
noncommercial use should be relatively easy to identify in practice. Further, it is unclear
whether the UDRP is intended to cover personality rights in individual names.149 A
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Report on the subject specifically
suggested that these rights are not covered under the UDRP.150 However, some UDRP
arbitrators have felt that in the absence of any specific prohibition on the protection of
such rights, they are covered by the UDRP.151 Thus, to the extent that complainants are
specifically basing claims on personality interests rather than trademark rights, there will
be some confusion as to whether or not they should be successful in the absence of a
trademark right.152
domain name registrant is using a domain name for commentary or otherwise to refer to the complainant in
a legitimate manner).
148

UDRP, clause 4(c)(3).

149

Moreland, supra note ___, at 394-5 (citing WIPO report to the effect that personality rights were
never intended to be covered by the UDRP).
150

Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, Sept 3, 2001, available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11,
2007, ¶199 (“It is clear that many sensitivities are offended by the unauthorized registration of personal
names as domain names. It is clear also that UDRP does not provide solace for all those offended
sensitivities, nor was it intended to do so, as originally designed. The result is that there are some
perceived injustices. Persons who have gained eminence and respect, but who have not profited from their
reputation in commerce, may not avail themselves of the UDRP to protect their personal names against
parasitic registrations. The UDRP is thus perceived by some as implementing an excessively materialistic
conception of contribution to society. Furthermore, persons whose names have become distinctive in
countries that do not recognize unregistered trademark rights are unlikely to find consolation in the UDRP
in respect of bad faith registration and use of their personal names as domain names in those countries.”), ¶
202 (“It is recommended that no modification be made to the UDRP to accommodate broader protection
for personal names than that which currently exists in the UDRP.”)
151

Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, Sept 3, 2001, available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11,
2007, ¶181-184 (surveying decisions in which UDRP arbitrators have ordered transfers of domain names
based on personal names); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm)
(“Respondent has argued that the Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process reveals that
“personality” disputes are outside the scope of the Policy. We would find the report persuasive on this
issue as “legislative history” if we found some ambiguity in the Policy itself. Because the Policy does not
purport to exclude the category of disputes involving “personality rights,” we join the many other Panels
that have recognized that the Policy does, indeed, protect such interests.”)
152

See, for example, Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm)
(“Respondent has argued that the Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process reveals that
“personality” disputes are outside the scope of the Policy. We would find the report persuasive on this
issue as “legislative history” if we found some ambiguity in the Policy itself. Because the Policy does not
purport to exclude the category of disputes involving “personality rights,” we join the many other Panels
that have recognized that the Policy does, indeed, protect such interests.”)
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The current application of the UDRP to personal domain name disputes is
certainly confused in terms of the scope of the policy over personal names. Some
arbitrators are more prepared to recognize protectable interests in personal names than
others, usually on the basis of an unregistered trademark right. Julia Roberts153 and Tom
Cruise154 were found to have trademark interests in their personal names, but a majority
panel of UDRP arbitrators felt that Bruce Springsteen did not have such rights.155 A
UDRP arbitrator also held that the late Anna Nicole Smith was not sufficiently famous to
assert a trademark interest in her personal name.156 In the political context, “Hillary
Clinton” has been recognized as a trademark under the UDRP,157 but the same was not
true for the Maryland gubernatorial candidate Kathleen Kennedy Townsend.158

153

Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ).
154

Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html).
155

Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan.
25, 2001, ¶ 6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It
appears to be an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that
in the case of very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving
rise to rights equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name
itself. It should be noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired
a secondary meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities
beyond the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music.
In the view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper
names of this nature.”)
156

Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National Arbitration
Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at: http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving
annanicolesmith.com domain name) (“it is unlikely that the evidence submitted here by Complainant of her
career, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in the name, which is a
requirement for Complainant to prevail on this aspect of the case. While the UDRP does not require a
registered trademark for protection of a trademark from a confusingly identical domain name, the mere fact
of having a successful career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to
the use of a name under the trademark laws. The cases require a clear showing of high commercial value
and significant recognition of the name as solely that of the performer. The Humphrey Bogart case cited by
the Complainant is a prime example of the type of case that would be expected to prevail, since virtually no
one familiar with the movie industry would fail to recognize his name as that of a famous movie star. The
Panel does not believe Complainant’s name has yet reached that level of fame.”)
157

Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an
author of a number of books sold in commerce.)
158

Kathleen Kennedy Townsend v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ) (individual politician in state
gubernatorial race held not to hold trademark rights in her personal name).
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Although one could attempt some factual distinctions, it appears that Roberts,
Cruise, Springsteen and the late Anna Nicole Smith are all basically entertainers who do
not sell products or services under their names in a trademark sense unless you consider
their names to be marks for the movies or television shows they appear in or the songs
they perform.159 If the marks work in this way, it is not clear why Bruce Springsteen
would not be a mark in the same way as Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise. A UDRP
arbitrator recognized a trademark interest in Hillary Clinton’s name partly on the basis
that she had authored books under her name.160 If this is the basis for a trademark interest
in a personal name, shouldn’t “Bruce Springsteen” also be a trademark as the writer and
performer of songs? If the test for trademarkability relates to whether a person has
written a song or book or appeared in a movie, then would this not lead to peculiar
results? For example, would all politicians and public figures have to write an
autobiography in order to achieve protected trademark status for their personal names
under the UDRP? What about merchandising to establish trademark rights?161 Senator
Barack Obama currently sells a series of “Obama 2008” merchandise on his campaign
website,162 as does Senator Clinton with respect to her own presidential campaign.163
Would the use of the Senators’ respective names on t-shirts, blankets and keyrings
amount to a trademark use?164
Obviously rules relating to the protection of trademark interests are not
automatically geared towards protecting personal names, although they may cover

159

Verna, supra note ___ (questioning why certain famous personalities are able to establish
trademark rights in their personal names for UDRP purposes while others are not).
160

Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an unregistered
trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her career as an
author of a number of books sold in commerce.)
161

See Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait
Accompli? 54 EMORY L J 461, 465 (2005) (describing merchandising right as the protected use of a
trademark not as a source indicator but as a desirable feature of a product) [hereinafter, Merchandising
Right]; Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1175-1178 (discussion of merchandising
right in trademark law).
162

See www.barackobama.com, last viewed on November 11, 2007.

163

Senator Clinton, in fact, has a stand-alone website for merchandising purposes. See
www.hillarystore.com, last viewed on November 11, 2007.

164

In Senator Obama’s case, it should be noted that he has already authored two books, so, following
the reasoning of the UDRP arbitrator in the <hillaryclinton.com> case, Senator Obama would arguably
already have trademark rights in his personal name on that basis: Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele
Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at
http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (Senator Clinton was regarded as having an
unregistered trademark right in her personal name in connection with both her political activities and her
career as an author of a number of books sold in commerce.)
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personal names in some cases.165 Creating a new PDRP that replaces the UDRP’s
trademark focus with a personality rights model would help here. It would lead to more
predictable results, and to the development of a more nuanced jurisprudence geared at
balancing the integrity of individual personas against other interests such as free speech.
It would remove the need for arbitrators to explain why certain individuals should have
trademark rights in their personal names while others would not. In so doing, it would
prevent an inappropriate expansion of trademark law into the personal name context in
cyberspace.

II. PERSONALITY RIGHTS
A. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PERSONAL NAME DISPUTES
The right of publicity has been described as, “the right of an individual to control
the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal
characteristics.”166 It derives originally from the right of privacy.167 Admittedly, this
genesis has caused some confusion about the scope of the modern day tort which covers
both privacy and some property-like aspects of an individual’s persona.168 Over the years,
the right has developed in different states sometimes as a matter of common law169 and
sometimes under state legislation.170 High profile examples include situations relating to
unauthorized uses of Elvis Presley’s name and likeness after his death,171 John Wayne’s
165

The obvious case is where the personal name is, in fact, used as a trademark in a business context.
See, for example, Trudeau v Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (involving Mr Kevin Trudeau’s
name as a domain name); Stephan Schmidheiny v Steven Weber, 285 F. Supp. 2d 613 (2003).
166

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1].

167

id, at § 2.16[5]; Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 406 (“It is worth asking why we are here, why the
doctrinal confusion is so extreme. One reason is that the doctrine [of the right of publicity] may have taken
a wrong turn forty-six years ago, when Second Circuit Judge Jerome Frank severed the right of publicity
from the right of privacy.”); GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at §2.16[1][a] (“some courts view the right
of publicity as a direct descendant of the right of privacy”); Madow, supra note ___, at 167 (“As Thomas
McCarthy tells the story, the right of publicity was “carved out of the general right of privacy” – “like Eve
from Adam’s rib.” In my view, this simile is … misleading. The right of publicity was created not so
much from the right of privacy as from frustration with it.”)
168

Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 407-8 (“The doctrine … developed in a schizoid manner: publicity
rights were purely economic property rights, as distinct from “personal” privacy rights (thereby enabling
publicity rights to become transferable and descendible); but publicity rights, even though economic in
nature, were also part of the tort of invasion of privacy, thereby implying that they should be viewed as a
species of personal privacy rights, and as such nonassignable and nondescendible.”); Dogan and Lemley,
Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1208-9 (noting that privacy based justifications for right of publicity are
legitimate and are different from economic trademark rationale for publicity rights).
169

Kentucky, for example, has a common law basis for the right of publicity: see discussion in
DINWOODIE AND JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note ___, at 823-827.
170

See, for example, Indiana Code Title 32 (Property), Art. 36 (Publicity), Chap. 1 (Rights of
Publicity).
171

Estate of Elvis Presley v Russen, 513 F Supp 1339 (1981).
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likeness on greeting cards,172 Martin Luther King’s likeness on unauthorized plastic
busts,173 Rosa Parks’ name as a song title,174 Arnold Schwarzenegger’s likeness as a
bobblehead doll,175 and Rudolph Giuliani’s likeness on an advertisement run on city buses
in New York City.176

172

See discussion in Madow, supra note ___, 141-143.

173

Martin Luther King Jr, Center for Social Change Inc v American Heritage Products, 694 F 2d 674
(11th Cir. 1993) (the estate of Martin Luther King Jr sought an injunction to prevent the defendant from
selling plastic busts of Dr King).
174

Rosa Parks v LaFace Records, 329 F 3d 437 (2003) (involving publicity rights of Rosa Parks in
the context of a song title using her name in relation to a hip hop recording that had nothing in particular to
do with her or her work)
175

Charles Harder and Henry L Self III, Schwarzenegger vs. Bobbleheads: The Case for
Schwarzenegger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 557 (2005); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech: Lessons from the Schwarzenegger
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581 (2005); David Welkowitz and Tyler
Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser: How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity to Terminate
Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 651 (2005).
176

New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority of the City of New York, 987 F Supp
254 (1997); aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and
the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998). Mayor Giuliani ultimately failed in his appeal on free speech
grounds. The right of publicity tort has also been extended to “lookalikes” and “soundalikes” of famous
people, notably the use of a Vanna White lookalike robot in a television commercial (Vanna White v
Samsung Electronics America Inc, 971 F 2d (9th Cir 1992); cert denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993)), and the use
of imitators of Bette Midler’s and Tom Waits’ distinctive singing voices in advertising campaigns: Bette
Midler v Ford Motor Company, 849 F 2d 460 (1988); Tom Waits v Frito-Lay Inc, 978 F 2d 1093 (1992).
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Because the right is arguably based both on aspects of property theory177 and
aspects of personhood,178 it is uniquely able to protect individual personas in ways that
more purely economically based laws – such as trademark law – cannot. Most
importantly, it protects aspects of an individual’s persona regardless of commercial
trademark rights in the person’s name. It can thus protect personas of celebrities, public
figures and private individuals against unauthorized commercial exploitations. Past
practices have demonstrated that the combination of interests people want to protect in
their names online179 corresponds to the same mixture of morally and economically based
protections derived from the right of publicity.180 A PDRP based on personality rights
177

Various justifications have been put forward for a property basis for personality rights, and have
equally been criticized over the years. For a discussion of property theory in this context, see Dogan and
Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for
personality rights as property); McKenna, supra, note ___, 247 (“It might be true that identity is
sufficiently similar to other objects the law regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the
sticks in the traditional bundle of property rights. But far too few courts and commentators have offered a
theory as to why any of the traditional property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of
Lockean labor theory justifications for property rights in personal identity); Haemmerli, supra note ___,
388 (“Both proponents and critics of the right of publicity generally perceive it as a property claim
grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8 (noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of
publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to
do so within this property context, and to use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of
a property right in identity or persona.”); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“This Article … contends that a
property-based conception for publicity rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our
theoretical conceptions of property.”); David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property
Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71 (2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Eileen
Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr, Center for Social Change, Inc
v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1165-9 (1985) (describing development of a
property rights rationale for the right of publicity). See also Diane Zimmerman and Melissa Jacoby,
Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1322 (2002).
178

See, for example, McKenna, supra note ___, at 285 (“Since all individuals share the interest in
autonomous self-definition, every individual should be able to control uses of her identity that interfere
with her ability to define her own public character.”, 286 (“Compelling a person to express a message
herself presents a particular sort of threat to her freedom of belief: It threatens her ability to control what
she tells the world about who she is and what she holds important …”); Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 390
(“Viewing the right of publicity as an extension of human worth and autonomy, rather than as a purely
economic interest, also changes the nature of the exercise that balances the right against competing social
claims …. [A] Kantian grounding is preferable to a Lockean justification not only because a Kantian
foundation forces the realization that the balancing challenge is complex, but because it more accurately
reflects the value of the human being behind the persona at issue.”); Rielly, supra note ___, 1164-5
(description of privacy foundations of the right of publicity).
179

For example, rights to control the economic value of their personas in cyberspace (e.g. Prince
threatening legal action against unauthorized fan sites’ exploitation of images and information about him)
as well as an interest in protecting individual privacy rights (e.g. the desires of some celebrities to prevent
anyone using a <name.com> version of their personal name, such as Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise).
180

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[5] (noting different courts’ approaches to treating the
right of publicity either as a property-based or a privacy-based right); Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 407-8
(“The doctrine … developed in a schizoid manner: publicity rights were purely economic property rights,
as distinct from “personal” privacy rights (thereby enabling publicity rights to become transferable and
descendible); but publicity rights, even though economic in nature, were also part of the tort of invasion of
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theory can draw on the policy justifications underpinning protection of an individual’s
persona against unauthorized use. This would include protections of an individual’s
online privacy as well as supporting that notion that individuals should have some
economic control of at least the <name.com> versions of their personal names.
Another advantage of personality rights theory is that it can effectively address
situations that fall somewhere in between privacy, defamation, copyright, and trademark
law. Consider, for example, a case where a person manufactures and sells an
unauthorized coffee mug bearing a photograph of Britney Spears. It may difficult for Ms
Spears to bring an invasion of privacy action when her persona has been developed
largely for public consumption. In other words, it is hard to claim invasion of privacy for
something that she herself has put into public view – her image and likeness181 – unless
the image on the coffee mug was taken in an unauthorized private context: for example,
by a photographer using a telephoto lens to shoot her in the privacy of her own home.182
Further, if the coffee mug does not suggest anything defamatory about Ms Spears, there
will be no remedy in defamation law.183 Copyright, also, will be an unlikely avenue for
Ms Spears unless she can bring a copyright infringement action with respect to the

privacy, thereby implying that they should be viewed as a species of personal privacy rights, and as such
nonassignable and nondescendible.”); Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1208-9
(noting that privacy based justifications for right of publicity are legitimate and are different from economic
trademark rationale for publicity rights); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 36-7 (“[Other than economic harm],
the right of publicity protects another type of incentive, one that focuses on moral rather than economic
concerns. For most celebrities, the cachet of fame is attributed to an image that the publicity plaintiff has a
reputational interest in controlling. The author has argued elsewhere that “the unauthorized use of an
individual’s persona potentially poses the maximum harm [to that individual] when the persona is being
appropriated in an objectionable context or for an objectionable purpose.” Although some celebrities still
might want to pursue the limelight even if the law sanctioned such unauthorized appropriations, other
celebrities, particularly those with strong moral philosophies, might not. The impact of the decisions
regarding the use of a celebrity’s persona are felt more directly by the celebrity since it is the celebrity,
rather than anyone in the celebrity’s entourage, whose reputation is at stake.”
181

Madow, supra note ___, at 168 (“Claims of … emotional injury [under privacy law] were not
nearly as convincing when they came from celebrities …. After all, how could a movie star or professional
athlete, who had deliberately and energetically sought the limelight, complain of embarrassment or hurt
feelings when an advertiser or merchandiser simply gave his face some additional publicity?”); Kwall,
Fame, supra note ___, 36 (“Some courts … hold that celebrities cannot maintain right-of-privacy actions,
although this view is not universal.”); Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1171 (noting
that privacy actions were not generally much use to celebrities because they were regarded as having
purposely sought out the limelight so there was no obvious invasion of privacy).
182

For a summary of the genesis of privacy rights based on media intrusion into personal space, see,
for example, Madow, supra note ___, at 167-170.
183

Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 36 (“Another significant disadvantage [for celebrities protecting
their personality rights] derives from the law of defamation, under which celebrities enjoy less protection
than other citizens. Defendants in defamation actions involving public officials and public figures must
meet the higher, “actual malice” standard of liability that requires knowledge of falsity as to the libelous
statement or reckless disregard as to its truth.”)
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photograph in question.184 She does not hold a copyright interest in her own person,
although she may own copyright in a particular photograph.
Trademark law, as we know, is also potentially problematic here. Trademark law
protects source indicators of products and services to prevent consumer confusion185 and
to encourage investment in developing those products and services.186 Thus, if Ms Spears
could establish trademark rights in her image, and could establish that the coffee mugs in
question were confusing consumers as to source, origin, or affiliation with her, she may
be able to establish a trademark infringement claim. Alternatively, if she could establish
a trademark in her image, and also that the coffee mugs were blurring or tarnishing the
mark in the marketplace, she may be able to sustain a claim in trademark dilution.187
However, it is not clear whether Ms Spears actually has a trademark in her name or
image.188
Even if Ms Spears could establish a trademark interest in her likeness, would it be
sufficiently connected to the sale of merchandise, like coffee mugs, to support a
successful trademark infringement action? It would seem more likely that any mark that
did exist would relate to concerts and music products and not merchandising of coffee
184

Copyright generally subsists in the author of an original work, which would typically include a
photographer in the case of a photograph, or the person who hired the photographer to take the photograph
under the “works for hire” doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title
vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”), § 201(b)(“ In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns
all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”)
185

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 5.01 (the general aim of trademark law is to prevent
consumer confusion about the source of products or services); DINWOODIE AND JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note ___, 16-17 (citing S. Rep No. 1333, 79th Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1946)) (“In the
United States, two primary justifications have traditionally been offered in support of trademark protection:
to “protect the public so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular
trademark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks for and which it wants to get”; and
to ensure that “where the owner of a trademark has spent energy, time and money in presenting to the
public the product, he is protected in his investment from its appropriation by pirates and cheats.””)
186

DINWOODIE AND JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note ___, 16-17 (citing S.
Rep No. 1333, 79th Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1946)) (“In the United States, two primary justifications have
traditionally been offered in support of trademark protection: to “protect the public so that it may be
confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows, it will get
the product which it asks for and which it wants to get”; and to ensure that “where the owner of a trademark
has spent energy, time and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment
from its appropriation by pirates and cheats.””)
187

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).

188

A search of the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademarks Database as of
November 11, 2007 shows that Britney Spears has, in fact, registered her name as a trademark for various
products and services. However, the mere fact of registration does not prove that a trademark is valid:
DINWOODIE AND JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note ___, at 315 (“Trademark
registration … does not create rights; it only confirms the existence of rights.”)
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mugs and associated products.189 While there are some trademark cases that accept
trademark infringement in the merchandising context,190 this use of trademark law has
been criticized as straying from the basis of trademark infringement law in protecting
marks per se rather than marks used as trademarks.191
Of course, there is also a possibility of a trademark dilution action, but, again, Ms
Spears would have to establish the existence of a trademark right in her image to begin
with, as well as establishing that the use of the picture on the coffee mug blurred or
tarnished her mark in some way. By increasing circulation of her image in the
marketplace, it may actually enhance the value of her mark rather than blurring or
tarnishing it.192 Additionally, the dilution action is limited to “famous marks”,193 and the
name of a famous person is not necessarily a famous mark.
189

A search of the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademarks Database as of
November 11, 2007 shows that Britney Spears has registered her name as a mark for a variety of products
including arts and craft kits, desk organizers and backpacks. However, there does not appear to be a
registration specifically for coffee mugs.
190

For a detailed critique of the merchandising right in trademark law, see Dogan and Lemley,
Merchandising Right, supra note ___.
191

In fact, there is currently a significant debate as to whether “trademark use” by a defendant is an
essential element of a trademark infringement action in the United States: Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark
Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L R 1597 (2007); Stacey Dogan
and Mark Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L R 1669 (2007);
Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Lessons from the Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA L R 1703 (2007);
Lastowka, supra note ___, 45-47.
192

Madow, supra note ___, at 168 (“Claims of … emotion injury [under privacy law] were not nearly
as convincing when they came from celebrities …. After all, how could a movie star or professional athlete,
who had deliberately and energetically sought the limelight, complain of embarrassment or hurt feelings
when an advertiser or merchandiser simply gave his face some additional publicity?”) There is also some
debate about whether increased circulation of a name or image actually increases or rather decreases the
value of the celebrity identity: McKenna, supra note ___, at 269-270 (“Landes and Posner argue that
overgrazing on identity leads to “face wearout,” a reduction in the value of one’s persona due to declining
interest in the person as her persona is increasingly used. Their argument is at odds with the well-known
maxim that “all publicity is good publicity,” though both sentiments are oversimplifications of the
phenomenon of fame. Publicity tends to feed off of itself and, as a result, many uses actually increase the
value of a celebrity’s identity, whatever the character of those uses. But additional publicity will increase
the value of an individual’s identity only until a certain point, after which interest may wane, along with the
value of the identity. In other words, early additional uses may create “network effects” that increase the
value of an identity, but at some point the number of uses will lead consumers to tire of the identity and it
no longer will capture their attention. In most cases, consumers lose interest in particular cultural objects
simply because something has come along that better defines them at that point in time. The point of
tedium, however, may be accelerated, at least in terms of chronological time, as a result of overexposure.
Some celebrities have more enduring cultural significance than others and, as a result, almost every aspect
of an identity’s long-term value will vary from individual to individual: the rate at which value is added by
early uses, the point at which additional uses begin to erode value and the value of the persona at that point,
and the rate at which the value will decline beyond the wearout point.”).
193

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (statutory definition of “famous mark” as inserted into the Lanham Act
under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, H.R. 683 of 2006).
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People other than sports and entertainment celebrities may have greater
difficulties with trademark focused laws. A politician, public figure, or private individual
may have more trouble establishing trademark rights in her name or likeness than a sports
or entertainment celebrity.194 Thus, if the above hypothetical involved Rudolph Giuliani
coffee mugs, rather than Britney Spears coffee mugs, Giuliani may have much more
trouble establishing a trademark interest in his name or likeness, simply because he does
not sell any goods or services in connection with his name or likeness in the trademark
sense.
These are the kinds of situations where personality rights may be extremely
helpful in substance, if not in terms of process or procedure.195 Personality rights cover
celebrity personas of course.196 However, they have also been used by politicians,197
public figures,198 and private individuals199 to provide remedies against unauthorized
commercial uses of their personas. Although generally regarded as an “economic” tort
protecting against commercial harm on the basis of a property-like right in a famous
person’s identity,200 it has also been recognized as having “moral” elements.201 The key
194

Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, Sept 3, 2001, ¶ 188, available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/processes/process2/report/html/report.html#5, last viewed on November 11,
2007 (“the names of political figures, religious leaders, scientists and historical persons may never have
been used in commerce and, thus, are unlikely to have trademarks associated with them.”).
195

There are a number of procedural disadvantages of the right of publicity as opposed to a fast and
inexpensive dispute resolution mechanism such as the UDRP. Judicial proceedings are more costly and
time-consuming than private arbitration. Additionally, jurisdictional problems arise with right of publicity
actions that do not arise under the UDRP. The procedural advantages of the UDRP were discussed in Part
I.B.4.
196

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1][b] (“The right of publicity is generally available
only to celebrities, the Luciano Pavarottis, the John McEnroes, the Robert Redfords. Cases involving
unknowns are usually brought under the older right of privacy.”)
197

New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 987 F Supp
254 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and
the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (action with respect to then Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s
personality rights).
198

Rosa Parks v LaFace Records, 329 F 3d 437 (2003) (involving publicity rights of Rosa Parks in
the context of a song title using her name in relation to a hip hop recording that had nothing in particular to
do with her or her work); Martin Luther King Jr, Center for Social Change Inc v American Heritage
Products, 694 F 2d 674 (11th Cir. 1993) (the estate of Martin Luther King Jr sought an injunction to prevent
the defendant from selling plastic busts of Dr King).
199

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1][a] (“The first successful right of privacy action for
appropriation of name and likeness was designed to enable a non-public figure to retain his anonymity.
The courts gave effect to the right by enjoining the unauthorized commercial use of the plainitff’s name and
likeness, and they awarded general damages for injury to individual feelings, much as is done for libel and
slander.”); Tellado v Time-Life Books, Inc., 643 F Supp 904 (D.N.J. 1986) (unauthorized use of image of
private individual plaintiff in Vietnam war for book and advertising materials relating to book); see also
discussion in Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___, 96-100.
200

Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 392 (“The right of publicity is traditionally formulated as the right
to exploit the commercial value of personal identity.”); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“a property-based
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moral harm that has been protected by the right of publicity is more like a privacy
protection than a property protection. The obvious example is where unauthorized
commercial use is made of an individual’s name or likeness in circumstances where that
individual wants to maintain privacy of her image, rather than control commercial profits
derived from her image. Another advantage of a right of publicity framework is that
courts have already engaged in balancing exercises between personality rights and the
First Amendment in a variety of contexts.202 Such jurisprudence is more relevant to the
personal domain name dispute context than that relating to the balance between
trademark interests and the First Amendment.
Questions have arisen under the right of publicity as to whether purely expressive
conduct by the defendant, not necessarily resulting in a commercial profit, should be
compensable. Rogers v Grimaldi,203 for example, is a case in which the expressive speech
conception for publicity rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our theoretical
conceptions of property”); Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1172-1174 (note growth
of the right of publicity as an economic right); Konsky, supra note ___, 349 (“most courts and
commentators now ground the right of publicity in property rationales.”); McKenna, supra note ___, at 226
(“Because the right of publicity has focused entirely on the economic value of a celebrity’s identity, courts
considering claims have no basis to differentiate among the variety of ways in which others might exploit
that value.”)
201

McKenna, supra note ___, at 231 (“All individuals have a legitimate interest in autonomous selfdefinition, and celebrities deserve protection against uses of their identities that implicate that interest.”);
Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 390 (“Viewing the right of publicity as an extension of human worth and
autonomy, rather than as a purely economic interest, also changes the nature of the exercise that balances
the right against competing social claims …. [A] Kantian grounding is preferable to a Lockean justification
not only because a Kantian foundation forces the realization that the balancing challenge is complex, but
because it more accurately reflects the value of the human being behind the persona at issue.”); Kwall, First
Amendment, supra note ___, 50 (“In evaluating the nature of the harm to the plaintiff, this Article asserts
that economic harms are typically far less onerous than nonmonetizable harms which derive from uses the
plaintiff would never have condoned. These nonmonetizable, or morally based, harms can include
reputational damage, distasteful associations, or uses which advance a substantive argument the plaintiff
finds objectionable. In addition, the potential for consumer deception is particularly strong where the use is
one to which the plaintiff would never have consented.”)
202

Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 441-458 (analysis of First Amendment issues arising with respect
to the right of publicity); Peter Felcher and Edward Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real
People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ 1577, 1590 (1979) (“The First Amendment inevitably defines the
operation and extent of the right of publicity; once the defendant can establish that the expression in
question is protected, he will almost invariably prevail.”); Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___
(suggesting a property versus liability rule basis for balancing First Amendment concerns against right of
publicity claims); Eileen Rielly, The Right of Publicity for Political Figures: Martin Luther King, Jr,
Center for Social Change, Inc v American Heritage Products, 46 U PITT L REV 1161, 1172-4 (1985)
(balancing First Amendment concerns with the publicity rights of public figures and politicians); Madow,
supra note ___, at 140 (description of the role of the consumer as an active and creative participant in the
creation of cultural commodities); Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, at 46-7 (“We do not deprive the owners of
famous trademarks or the copyright owners of popular works of art or literature of their rights just because
the public has played some role in placing a value on these works. Therefore, right-of-publicity critics
must justify why the cachet of a person’s fame should be treated differently.”). See also Diane
Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35 (1998).
203

875 F 2d 994 (1988).
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elements of the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s name and likeness were not
compensable under trademark law or under the right of publicity.204 In that case, the
defendant had used the title “Ginger and Fred” in a film about a cabaret act that
impersonated Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.205 The court held that the defendants had
used no more of Ms Rogers’ identity than was necessary for expressive artistic
purposes.206 Ms Rogers was therefore unsuccessful on her claims in both trademark law
and publicity rights.
In the Internet context, one analog to the Rogers facts might be the use of a
personal domain name resolving to a website that commented on the person in question.
The commentary could be a fan website, a parody, or a website critical of the person.
Assuming the domain name registrant did not receive any commercial profit from the use
of the domain name, the right of publicity may not provide any compensation to the
plaintiff. However, if the registrant was attempting to make a profit from the name either
by selling the name itself – that is, cybersquatting – or by using the name to attract
customers to the website for commercial purposes, a right of publicity claim would more
likely be successful.

B. DOES A PERSONALITY RIGHTS FRAMEWORK IMPROVE ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION?
1. Personality Rights vs the UDRP
Despite the theoretical suitability of personality rights law for personal domain
name disputes, most disputes are currently brought under the UDRP?207 There are a
number of reasons why this has been the case, relating to cost, timing, and general
204

id.

205

id., 996-7.

206

id., 1005 (“[W]e hold that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not bar a minimally relevant use
of a celebrity's name in the title of an artistic work where the title does not explicitly denote authorship,
sponsorship, or endorsement by the celebrity or explicitly mislead as to content. Similarly, we conclude
that Oregon law on the right of publicity, as interpreted by New York, would not bar the use of a celebrity's
name in a movie title unless the title was "wholly unrelated" to the movie or was "simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.")
207

There are only a small handful of cases where the right of publicity has been argued in the domain
name context. See, for example, Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (in
which a right of publicity claim was made, amongst other unfair competition claims, in a dispute involving
a domain name corresponding with the plaintiff’s personal name); Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002) (plaintiff brought a claim under § 17525 of the Californian Business and
Professions Code, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as it protects
personal names in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses); Beezy, supra note ___, at 23-24
(noting high success rate of celebrities in personal domain name proceedings under the UDRP and
surveying some of the recent decisions); Moreland, supra note ___, at 386 (noting high success rate of
celebrities in personal domain name disputes under the UDRP, and citing Statistical Summary for
Proceedings under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (February 26, 2001), 394 (“A
plethora of disputes involving personal names have been submitted to ICANN Arbitration.”)).
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accessibility for individual complainants when compared to litigation under either
trademark or right of publicity law.208 Judicial proceedings will be more costly and time
and resource intensive than online arbitration.209 Compared even with federal trademark
law, the right of publicity has a number of procedural disadvantages. For one thing, it is
state law that is not harmonized nationally within the United States,210 let alone globally.
This potentially causes conflicts of law issues, including problems of asserting
jurisdiction over an out of state defendant,211 as well as choice of law issues.212
Apart from these problems with litigation, it is likely that complainants are simply
more focused on the UDRP for any domain name dispute than with the right of publicity.
When complainants and their legal counsel think of personal domain name disputes, they
probably instinctively categorize them as “domain name disputes”, rather than “personal
name disputes” and so focus on the set of rules geared towards resolving the former.213 In
many ways, this is a problem of classification. If one classifies a given dispute as a
“domain name dispute” rather than as a “dispute to protect the integrity of an individual’s
persona”, one will tend to think of domain name focused rules, rather than personal
identity rules.
This article identifies advantages in marrying the substance of the personality
rights tort with the procedural advantages of the UDRP to arrive at the best solutions
regardless of whether the dispute is classified as being primarily “about domain names”
208

Moreland, supra note ___, at 395 (“ICANN Arbitration offers celebrities and their lawyers a
quick, cost effective and usually successful means to recover domain names registered by third parties that
incorporate the celebrity’s name.”)
209

id.

210

Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 389 (“Existing practice [under the right of publicity] is …
confused, with fifty state regimes protecting differing aspects of identity, for varied terms, and with
disparate remedies.”); GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The publicity right is still
developing and the courts are far from unanimous in defining its scope. Precedent (or the lack of it) in the
selected forum may thus dictate reliance on trademark rights and unfair competition claims to the exclusion
of, or in addition to, the publicity right.”); Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994, 1002-1004 (1988) (court
discussing problems of applying Oregon’s right of publicity law in a New York forum).
211

This has been an issue with respect to personal domain name disputes in the past. See Paul
Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024, ¶¶ 1-3 (2002) (discussion of jurisdictional
issues raised in complaint against cybersquatter’s registration of paulwright.com domain name). The
movie actor Kevin Spacey was also initially unsuccessful in a cybersquatting claim against the registrant of
kevinspacey.com on jurisdictional grounds, but later succeeded under a UDRP proceeding: Kieren
McCarthy, Kevin Spacey Loses Pivotal Cybersquatting Court Case, THE REGISTER, Nov 26, 2001
(available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/11/26/kevin_spacey_loses_pivotal_cybersquatting/, last
viewed on November 8, 2007).
212

See, for example, Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994, 1002-1004 (1988) (court discussing problems
of applying Oregon’s right of publicity law in a New York forum).
213

Of course, there are some legislative provisions that could be categorized as aimed at both domain
name disputes and personal names: for example, 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A). However, these laws require
expensive domestic litigation as opposed to inexpensive online arbitration.
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or “about personality”. Under a new PDRP, one could achieve the time and cost benefits
of the UDRP, but with a clearer focus on the aspects of an individual’s persona that
should be protected in the domain space as a substantive policy matter. One could also
avoid undesirable expansions of trademark law into matters involving personal names
that do not really operate as trademarks, as well as minimizing inconsistencies in
arbitrations about which personal names should be accepted as trademarks.
In substance, what would a personality rights based PDRP do differently than the
UDRP? Take, at a broad level of generality, the two major classes of conduct that
concern potential personal domain name complainants. The first are cybersquatting
situations where a registrant has registered or used a domain name corresponding with
the plaintiff’s personal name with the intent to sell it for a profit. The second are
situations where a registrant does not want to sell the domain name, but wants to use it
for commercial or commentary purposes. With respect to the first class – cybersquatting
– a personality rights framework improves on the UDRP in several ways. It does not
require the complainant to establish a trademark interest in her personal name.214 Thus, it
applies equally to extremely famous celebrities215 as to politicians,216 public figures,217 and
214

Of course, infringement under legislative provisions such as 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A) does not
require establishment of a trademark in a personal name, but it does require often expensive litigation.
215

The right of publicity has its most obvious applications in the case of celebrity personas: GILSON
LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity, a developing common law right of great
value to the celebrity …”); Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1164 (conceiving right
of publicity in terms of protecting celebrities’ names and likenesses); Bette Midler v Ford Motor Company,
849 F 2d 460 (1988) (right of publicity action involving Bette Midler’s distinctive singing voice); Tom
Waits v Frito-Lay Inc, 978 F 2d 1093 (1992) (right of publicity action involving Tom Waits’ distinctive
singing voice); Rogers v Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994 (1988) (right of publicity action involving Ginger Rogers’
name); Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L J 1,
141-142 (2004) (“Celebrities play a central role in discourse today … In a world of increasing
fragmentation, references to celebrities are essential for dialogue on issues such as culture and values … By
putting alternative conceptions of celebrity off limits, the right of publicity … threatens to suppress
expression and to give celebrities the power to censor alternative versions of their images that are, for
example, iconoclastic or irreverent.”); McKenna, supra note ___, at 226 (conceiving of the right of
publicity as being focused “entirely on the economic value of a celebrity’s identity”); Madow, supra note
___ (critiquing the right of publicity in the celebrity context).
216

Rielly, supra note ___, at 1169-1172 (discussing the application of the right of publicity to
political figures); New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority and the City of New York, 987
F Supp 254 (1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, New York Magazine v The Metropolitan Transit Authority
and the City of New York, 136 F.3d 123 (1998) (on Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s rights of privacy and
publicity); Charles Harder and Henry L Self III, Schwarzenegger vs. Bobbleheads: The Case for
Schwarzenegger, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 557 (2005); William Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property
Litigation, the Right of Publicity, and the Attenuation of Free Speech: Lessons from the Schwarzenegger
Bobblehead Doll War (and Peace), 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 581 (2005); David Welkowitz and Tyler
Ochoa, The Terminator as Eraser: How Arnold Schwarzenegger Used the Right of Publicity to Terminate
Non-Defamatory Political Speech, 45 SANTA CLARA L REV 651 (2005); Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns
Hillary.com? Political Speech and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55
(2008).
217

Rosa Parks v LaFace Records, 329 F 3d 437 (2003) (involving publicity rights of Rosa Parks in
the context of a song title using her name in relation to a hip hop recording that had nothing in particular to
do with her or her work); Martin Luther King Jr, Center for Social Change Inc v American Heritage
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private individuals,218 not to mention “lesser celebrities”.219 It would clearly cover
cybersquatting because it prevents the use of another’s name or likeness for an
unauthorized commercial profit.220 Thus, it would cover all cybersquatting involving a
personal name regardless of the trademarkability of the name.221
One might argue that the deficiencies of the UDRP here could be remedied easily
enough by simply including a personal name as a protected interest under the UDRP
alongside a trademark. This would prohibit all cybersquatting involving any personal
name regardless of whether or not the name in question operated as a trademark.222
Products, 694 F 2d 674 (11th Cir. 1993) (the estate of Martin Luther King Jr sought an injunction to prevent
the defendant from selling plastic busts of Dr King).
218

Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (in which a right of
publicity claim was made, amongst other unfair competition claims, in a dispute involving a domain name
corresponding with the plaintiff’s personal name); Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16024 (2002) (plaintiff brought a claim under § 17525 of the Californian Business and Professions
Code, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as it protects personal names
in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses).
219

In other words, it would cover situations where people like Bruce Springsteen and Anna Nicole
Smith had trouble convincing UDRP arbitrators that they held trademark interests in their personal names.
See Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 25,
2001, ¶ 6 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“It appears
to be an established principle from cases such as Jeanette Winterson, Julia Roberts, and Sade that in the
case of very well known celebrities, their names can acquire a distinctive secondary meaning giving rise to
rights equating to unregistered trade marks, notwithstanding the non-registerability of the name itself. It
should be noted that no evidence has been given of the name "Bruce Springsteen" having acquired a
secondary meaning; in other words a recognition that the name should be associated with activities beyond
the primary activities of Mr. Springsteen as a composer, performer and recorder of popular music. In the
view of this Panel, it is by no means clear from the UDRP that it was intended to protect proper names of
this nature.”); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004 (available at http://www.adr-forum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm),
last viewed on October 25, 2007 (“it is unlikely that the evidence submitted here by the Complainant of her
career, in and of itself, is sufficient to establish common law trademark rights in the name, which is a
requirement for Complainant to prevail on this aspect of the case. While the UDRP does not require a
registered trademark for protection of a trademark from a confusingly identical domain name, the mere fact
of having a successful career as an actress, singer or TV program star does not provide exclusive rights to
the use of a name under the trademark laws.”).
220

Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___, 47 (“The right of publicity is a legal theory which
enables individuals to protect themselves from unauthorized, commercial appropriations of their
personas.”); Carrier, supra note ___, 22-23 (“The right of publicity prevents the appropriation of an
individual’s name or likeness for commercial advantage.”); Konsky, supra note ___, 347 (“The right of
publicity prohibits commercial use of a person’s name or likeness without the person’s consent.”); GILSON
LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an individual to control the
commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal characteristics.”)
221

Of course, § 1129 of the Lanham Act would also cover the same conduct. However, that involves
litigation as opposed to inexpensive online arbitration, so a PDRP would be an improvement over the
Lanham Act for personal domain name disputes.
222

See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com? Political Speech and the First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008).
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Nevertheless, the UDRP for the most part is still geared at protecting marks in cyberspace
against unauthorized commercial uses likely to confuse consumers as to source or origin
of goods or services.223 In other words, it is still focused on aspects of trademark law that
are not necessarily well suited to addressing concerns about unauthorized commercial
uses of personal names. Thus, even adding a personal name as a protected interest under
the existing UDRP would likely lead to inconsistent and arbitrary results as UDRP
arbitrators attempted to apply trademark-like tests to personal name disputes.
Additionally, the UDRP is not particularly appropriate for the second class of
personal domain name conflicts: that is, situations in which the registrant does not want
to sell the name for a profit, but rather wants to use it herself for some reason. These
situations really boil down into two sub-categories which can overlap: commerce and
commentary. Some unauthorized uses of a personal domain name will be commercial
and some will be for commentary purposes – whether it be idolatry, parody or criticism,
or a combination. Additionally, it is possible for a website to contain elements of
commerce and elements of commentary simultaneously. A fan website may charge a fee
for joining a relevant fan club, online chat group or the like. It may equally sell
unauthorized celebrity merchandise. A website critical of a particular person may sell or
advocate the sale of merchandise or information supporting a view critical of that person
or her views.224 Even a parody website may advocate the sale of merchandise critical of
the person or institution being parodied.225 These kinds of cases raise difficult questions
of balancing interests in an individual’s persona against the First Amendment.
Personality rights law is the body of law that has historically dealt with this balance.
Trademark law has dealt with a similar balance relating to protecting free speech against
trademark interests.226 However, the interests of a trademark holder are somewhat

223

See, for example, UDRP, para 4(b) (“the following circumstances, in particular but without
limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain
name in bad faith: (i) circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired the domain
name primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to
the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that complainant,
for valuable consideration in excess of your documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to the domain
name; or (ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the trademark or service
mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that you have engaged in a
pattern of such conduct; or (iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor; or (iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted
to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other on-line location, by creating a
likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or
endorsement of your web site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.”)
224

See, for example, Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F 3d 309 (2005) (gripesite contained links to
amazon.com webpage selling a book critical of the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s views on homosexuality).
225

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v Doughney, 113 F Supp 2d 915 (2000); aff’d 263
F.3d 359 (2001) (parody site linking to websites where fur and animal products antithetical to plaintiff’s
views were available for sale).
226

For a general discussion of these issues, see also Jacqueline Lipton, Commerce versus
Commentary: Gripe Sites, Parody and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 WASH U L REV 1327
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different to those of an individual in her persona – and the appropriate body of rules
should be applied in each case. Rights in individual personas flow from both theories of
personhood and theories of property,227 while trademark rights are focused purely on
commercial source identifiers.228

2. Case Study 1: Unauthorized Celebrity Websites
Two examples might be useful to illustrate ways in which a personality rights
framework for personal domain name disputes might differ from a trademark-focused
model. Two obvious cases might be: (a) a celebrity concerned about an unauthorized fan
website utilizing her personal name as a domain name; and, (b) a politician concerned
about a website that uses her personal name as a domain name and contains messages
critical of her, or her views. These examples have been chosen because they both
implicate First Amendment concerns. However, the first example may additionally
implicate commercial values much more than the second example. Each example deals
with ways in which a personality rights framework might balance the complainant’s
rights in her persona against First Amendment concerns.
(2006); Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for
Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW 973 (2007).
227

On theories of the right of publicity with a focus on personhood and individual autonomy, see
Haemmerli, supra note ___. On the property theory basis for the right of publicity, see Dogan and Lemley,
Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for
personality rights as property); McKenna, supra note ___, 247 (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently
similar to other objects the law regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the
traditional bundle of property rights. But far too few courts and commentators have offered a theory as to
why any of the traditional property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of Lockean
labor theory justifications for property rights in personal identity); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The
Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 343, 388 (“Both proponents and critics of the right of
publicity generally perceive it as a property claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8 (1999)
(noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that
commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to do so within this property context, and to
use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of a property right in identity or persona.”);
Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“This Article … contends that a property-based conception for publicity
rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our theoretical conceptions of property.”);
David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71
(2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Rielly, supra note __, 1165-9 (describing
development of a property rights rationale for the right of publicity). See also Diane Zimmerman and
Melissa Jacoby, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322 (2002).
228

Traditional trademark law has generally been premised on two interconnected aims: (a) to protect
the public when purchasing a product or service to ensure that the purchasers get what they think they are
paying for in terms of goods or services from a particular source; and, (b) to ensure that those who invest in
developing goodwill in a particular mark are protected against unfair misappropriations of that goodwill.
See GRAEME DINWOODIE and MARK JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, 563-566 (2004)
(citing S. Rep. No. 1333. 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946)); Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, Trademarks and
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 777, 786 (2004) (noting the benefits to
both consumers and producers of consumers having access to ‘truthful information about the source of
products and services’.)
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In the first case, the trademark-focused laws would obviously not help the
celebrity at all unless she could establish a trademark interest in her personal name.229
Assuming she could establish such an interest, she would have to establish that the
website in question was confusing consumers for a trademark infringement action,230 was
dilutive of her name in commerce for a dilution action,231 or was registered and used in
bad faith for an ACPA action232 or a UDRP arbitration. This is putting to one side an
action under the personal name provisions of the Lanham Act on the basis that they only
prohibit bad faith intents to sell the relevant domain name,233 and not unauthorized uses of
the name per se.
An unauthorized fan website is probably not confusing to consumers provided
that it is not passing itself off as an authorized fan website. Thus, a disclaimer might cure
any confusion and mitigate against the likelihood of a successful trademark infringement
action.234 If no commercial activity is conducted on the website, it is not likely to be “in
commerce” for the purposes of a dilution action.235 However, if there are commercial
activities, such as charging membership fees or engaging in advertising, could an
unauthorized fan site be said to be dilutive of a celebrity persona as a mark? Even if
there is some commercial activity, it is possible that the use of the domain name could be
excused under the new “commentary” defense to dilution inserted into the Lanham Act in
2006.236 Obviously, the fan site creates some “noise” around the celebrity’s name, but
229

Obviously, 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1) applies in the absence of a trademark interest as discussed above.
However, it only prohibits cybersquatting and does not cover any other unauthorized uses of a domain
name corresponding with a person’s name.
230

15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (infringement of registered trademarks); 1125(a) (infringement of unregistered
trademarks).
231

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).

232

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

233

15 U.S.C. § 1129(1).

234

Bridgestone Firestone v Myers, WIPO Case No, D2000-0190, July 6, 2000, (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0190.html) (“In the cybersquatting cases,
the domain names in question generally were www.trademark.com domain names, which prevented the
trademark holder from utilizing the customary commercial domain name for its “official” site …. Here,
however, the domain name registrant has not usurped the <.com> domain, but has utilized only the <.net>
domain, has posted disclaimers on the website homepage, and has included criticism or commentary on the
site so that a reasonably prudent Internet user can tell that the site is not the trademark holder’s “official”
site.”); Haemmerli, supra note ___, at 400 (noting a non-Internet setting that the use of a highly visible
disclaimer on a film might negate likelihood of confusion); but see also Planned Parenthood Federation of
America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, pp 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (defendant’s use of
plannedparenthood.com domain name for messages critical of the Planned Parenthood organization would
likely confuse consumers as to the source of various services provided by the plaintiff regardless of the use
of a disclaimer).
235

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).

236

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (excusing identifying the plaintiff for the purposes of parody,
criticism and commentary from the scope of a trademark dilution action).
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such noise may be reinforcing the celebrity’s identity, rather than blurring or detracting
from it.237 Additionally, a celebrity’s name is unlikely to meet the definition of “famous
mark”.238 Thus, a dilution action may not be successful in this case. Further, if the
domain name has been registered not in bad faith but for the purposes of legitimate fan
related commentary, the provisions of § 1125(d)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act are unlikely to
be satisfied in terms of a traditional cybersquatting action.239
Would the right of publicity give a different result here and, just as importantly,
should it? One might argue that because trademark laws carry these inherent limitations,
partly to balance them against First Amendment concerns, the same should be true of
personality rights law. Otherwise, individual names and likenesses will be overpropertized and this result will chill free expression on the Internet. However, it is
important not to consider rights in personal names with too much emphasis on trademark
law. Personality rights clearly implicate a number of concerns similar to trademark
law.240 However, they also protect other aspects of an individual’s personality, such as
the right to keep certain aspects of a persona out of the public domain. Thus, while
trademark jurisprudence may in some ways inform the development of personality rights
jurisprudence, trademarks are not the same as personality rights.241
237

See McKenna, supra note ___, at 269-270 (“Landes and Posner argue that overgrazing on identity
leads to “face wearout,” a reduction in the value of one’s persona due to declining interest in the person as
her persona is increasingly used. Their argument is at odds with the well-known maxim that “all publicity
is good publicity,” though both sentiments are oversimplifications of the phenomenon of fame. Publicity
tends to feed off of itself and, as a result, many uses actually increase the value of a celebrity’s identity,
whatever the character of those uses. But additional publicity will increase the value of an individual’s
identity only until a certain point, after which interest may wane, along with the value of the identity. In
other words, early additional uses may create “network effects” that increase the value of an identity, but at
some point the number of uses will lead consumers to tire of the identity and it no longer will capture their
attention. In most cases, consumers lose interest in particular cultural objects simply because something
has come along that better defines them at that point in time. The point of tedium, however, may be
accelerated, at least in terms of chronological time, as a result of overexposure. Some celebrities have
more enduring cultural significance than others and, as a result, almost every aspect of an identity’s longterm value will vary from individual to individual: the rate at which value is added by early uses, the point
at which additional uses begin to erode value and the value of the persona at that point, and the rate at
which the value will decline beyond the wearout point.”)

238

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) now defines “famous mark” as follows: “[A] mark is famous if it is
widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods or services of the mark's owner. In determining whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of
recognition, the court may consider all relevant factors, including the following: (i) The duration, extent,
and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the
owner or third parties. (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered
under the mark. (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark….”
239

The same will be true of an attempt to satisfy the bad faith requirements of the UDRP: see UDRP,
clause 4(b).
240

For a detailed discussion of the similarities between trademark law and the right of publicity, see
Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___.
241

Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, at 1211 (noting differences between
personality rights and trademarks, including the fact that there is no “use in commerce” or secondary
meaning requirement for complainants under the right of publicity).
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The right of publicity tort does not require the complainant to establish
trademark-like incidents in her personal name or likeness.242 This is clearly an advantage
for complainants over the UDRP. However, the commercial use requirement could be a
problem here in the same way that it could be a problem in a trademark-based action. If
the view is taken that all Internet conduct is commercial because of the nature of the
Internet,243 the commercial use requirement is automatically satisfied. If not, it may be
that the nature of the activities on the website could satisfy the commercial use
requirement only if the registrant was advertising, 244 or selling products or services on the
relevant website. This may well be as it should be. A purely expressive website, even in
the <name.com> space, should perhaps be protected speech where there is no unfair or
unauthorized commercial gain being made from someone else’s persona.
On the other hand, the right of publicity protects individuals from being thrust
into the limelight against their wishes245 – this is the privacy aspect of the right, usually
applied more to private individuals than celebrities on the basis that the latter are
presumably expecting, and even overtly seeking, the limelight.246 While the privacybased aspects of the right of publicity are usually geared towards private individuals, and
even then at public commercial uses of a private individual’s persona,247 there may be
some scope to argue that celebrities should have some privacy rights in relation to at least

242

id.

243

Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, page 11 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (“Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must use interstate telephone
lines to access defendant's web site on the Internet. The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a
typical home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham Act's "in commerce"
requirement.”). But note that this reasoning relates to the Lanham Act’s “in commerce” requirement in
particular and may not automatically apply to the right of publicity. An example of a similar judicial
interpretation that everything on the Internet is automatically “in commerce” outside the trademark context
is found in American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“In addition,
many of those users who are communicating for private, noncommercial purposes are nonetheless
participants in interstate commerce by virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain access to the
Internet by means of an on-line service provider, such as America Online, which charges a fee for its
services. "Internet service providers," including plaintiffs Panix, Echo, and NYC NET, also offer Internet
access for a monthly or hourly fee. Patrons of storefront "computer coffee shops," such as New York's own
CyberCafe, similarly pay for their access to the Internet, in addition to partaking of food and beverages sold
by the cafe. Dial-in bulletin board systems often charge a fee for access.”)
244

See, for example, Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006,
para. 4 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (the
relevant website included links to services and products that were not connected with the complainant).
245

See Dogan and Lemley, Right of Publicity, supra note ___, at 1167.

246

id.

247

See, for example, Tellado v Time-Life Books, Inc, 643 F Supp 904 (D.N.J. 1986) (involving the
unauthorized use of a Vietnam war veteran’s photo on promotional materials for a series of books about the
Vietnam war).
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<name.com> versions of their names online. There have been cases where the right to
publicity has prevented public uses of likenesses of private individuals even where there
is no direct economic harm to the plaintiff and where the plaintiff’s concern is with moral
privacy-related objections to the use of the image, rather than economic benefits.248
Although one might argue that celebrities should not be entitled to bring such
actions because of their admittedly public personas, the nature of the Internet brings a
new scope and scale to the idea of unauthorized public distribution.249 Whereas a plaintiff
in the past may have been concerned about emotional distress or loss of privacy in
relation to an unauthorized billboard advertisement in one or more specific geographical
locations, today’s plaintiff may face a complete loss of privacy in the face of the whole
world.250 Thus, even a celebrity may be entitled to some control of Internet content about
her on this basis, particularly if that control is initially limited to the <name.com> space
which is likely the most closely associated with the idea of the celebrity’s authorized
online persona. A PDRP based on a personality rights framework might justify this
result. Decisions under the PRDP based on balancing the rights of a given celebrity in
her persona against the registrant’s free speech entitlements would create a more nuanced
jurisprudence for these situations in cyberspace. Such a jurisprudence might ultimately
inform the development of personality rights in cyberspace more generally: that is,
perhaps in other domain spaces, or with respect to the use of unauthorized celebrity
images on websites that do not use the complainant’s name in the domain space at all. In
any event, it is the right of publicity, rather than trademark law, that most appropriately
deals with these questions.

3. Case Study 2: Unauthorized Political Websites
With respect to the second hypothetical raised above – a website critical of a
politician under a <name.com> domain – trademark focused laws are again a poor fit. 251
They are not aimed at balancing a politician’s rights in her persona against the public
interest in free speech. Most politicians do not have, or should not be regarded as having,
trademarks in their personal names. The balance of their interests in their names against
the public’s right to comment about them should not be a part of trademark law.
However, it might be determined effectively by personality rights principles.

248

id; Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___, at 96-100 (discussion of Tellado v Time-Life Books,
Inc, 643 F Supp 904 (D.N.J. 1986) – a publicity rights case involving emotional distress to the plaintiff,
rather than economic loss).
249

See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET, 33 (2007) (“The Internet … makes gossip a permanent reputational stain, one that never fades.
It is available around the world, and with Google it can be readily found in less than a second.”)
250

id.

251

Other than potentially provisions such as 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1) that do not require a trademark
interest, although this provision is limited to cybersquatting so would not be relevant in a situation where
the domain name registrant did not want to ultimately sell the name for a profit.
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Even in a situation where a politician can establish trademark rights in her name,
a trademark infringement action is an unlikely candidate for resolving issues about
unauthorized political commentary. There will likely be no consumer confusion in such
cases. It is possible that a court liberally applying the initial interest confusion doctrine252
would find confusion here in the sense that the Internet user is initially confused by use of
the <name.com> domain name and ends up on a website she did not desire to access.253
However, the initial interest confusion test is not universally accepted in trademark law.254
Even in cases where a court was prepared to adopt the doctrine, the case of a political
criticism website could be distinguished from prior initial interest confusion cases on the
basis that the prior cases have generally had something to do with competing commercial
activity, rather than purely expressive content.255
Trademark dilution will also not be an appropriate fit for these situations. The
point of trademark dilution is to protect famous commercial marks from losing their
distinctiveness in the marketplace,256 and not to protect politicians against undesired
commentary.257 Even where politicians can establish trademarks in their names for
infringement purposes, they would have to establish a “famous mark” for dilution
purposes. 258 This would be difficult even for well-known politicians.259 Even if
sufficient fame could be shown, the complainant politician would still have to satisfy the
252

Lastowka, supra note ___, 35-36 (“With respect to search engines … a … significant expansion of
trademark law is the doctrine of initial interest confusion. Traditionally, and not surprisingly, most courts
have focused analysis of consumer confusion on the time period proximate to consumer purchases. The
doctrine of initial interest confusion shifts the focus of confusion analysis to a time prior to the time of
purchase. Initial interest confusion can be found to exist even if that confusion was not present at the time
of purchase.”); see also Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L REV 105 (2005); Goldman, supra note ___, 559 (“[Initial interest
confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform standard for analyzing
claims. With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut down junior
users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”)
253

See, for example, Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (in which court held that even the use of a disclaimer on the relevant website would not
detract from such confusion).
254

Lastowka, supra note ___, at 36 (“Though not all federal circuits have endorsed the doctrine of
initial interest confusion and the Supreme Court has yet to consider a case applying it, many courts have
accepted and applied the doctrine.”)
255

See, for example, survey of relevant cases in Lastowka, supra note ___, at 36.

256

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 5A.01[1] (“Federal dilution law protects famous trademarks
from unauthorized uses that are likely to impair their distinctiveness or harm their reputation.”)
257

In fact, the recently adopted 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) provides an express “commentary”
defense to a dilution action.
258

In particular, the new definition of “famous mark” for dilution purposes contemplates fame with
respect to the sale of goods or services: 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). This is not the kind of interest usually
associated with politicians’ names.
259

id.
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“blurring or tarnishment”260 and “in commerce”261 requirements. Additionally, there is
now a new “commentary” defense to dilution that may become relevant in these
situations.262 Blurring could be difficult to establish here as a website critical of a
politician is not likely to blur the distinctive power of the politician’s name as a mark, but
rather reinforces the politician’s identity, while criticizing her. Internet users accessing
either <bobkeenan.com> or <lindamcculloch.com> would have a clear and accurate idea
of the respective personal identities of Bob Keenan and Linda McCulloch. They would
simply be exposed to views critical of Keenan and McCulloch.
Tarnishment may be a possibility in such cases, but, again, the registrant’s
conduct may be tarnishing the politician’s personal reputation, but would be unlikely to
be tarnishing the politician’s name in a trademark sense. Criticizing a politician’s views
on a particular issue will not interfere with the integrity of the politician’s name as a mark
in connection with the sale of goods or services, such as books and campaign
merchandise. It will rather impact on the way in which people regard the politician and
her suitability for office. Such criticism may even increase sales of books written by the
relevant politician by people interested in learning more about the politician’s views
spurred on by the criticisms of the politician. Finally, there is the issue of whether purely
expressive content is “in commerce” for dilution purposes.263 A commentary website,
such as the <bobkeenan.com> and <lindamcculloch.com> examples do not appear to
have any commercial application. Thus, unless all Internet conduct is regarded as
commercial, pure political gripesites will likely not satisfy the threshold for trademark
dilution. Even if the conduct is regarded as being “in commerce”, it may still be excused
under the new “commentary” defense to a dilution action.264 This is not surprising,
because trademark dilution was never intended to cover political commentary.
The ACPA and the UDRP will not help much with this balance because of their
focus on commercial bad faith cybersquatting. Sections 1125(d) and 1129(1)(A) of the
Lanham Act each assume that the defendant’s purpose in registering a relevant domain
name is to make a bad faith commercial profit. A registrant who has registered a
politician’s name as a domain name for expressive purposes is unlikely to satisfy the test
set out in either section. Section 1125(d) will not apply unless the politician has a
trademark in her name. The UDRP would likely excuse commentary about a politician
under a corresponding domain name, even a <name.com> name, as a legitimate use of
the name.265 In any event, it will not apply to a politician if her name does not operate as
a trademark.266 The same may be said of California’s Business and Professions Code,
260

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (dilution by blurring); § 1125(c)(2)(C) (dilution by tarnishment).

261

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).

262

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).

263

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).

264

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).

265

UDRP, para. 4(c)(iii).

266

UDRP, para. 4(a)(i).
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although there is little case law or commentary available on that legislation to date. Even
though the key provision in § 17525(a) contemplates bad faith registrations of domain
names without regard to goods or services of the parties, several of the bad faith factors
relate to trademark-like concepts.267 The provision that does contemplate misleading
voters as a bad faith factor does not make it clear whether a political commentary site
would be excused as not misleading voters as to source or affiliation of the website.268
Again, all of this may well be as it should be. It may be that there should be no
law giving a politician any rights against a registrant of a corresponding domain name,
even a <name.com> name, where the registrant’s purpose is political commentary.
However, there may be room for a presumption online that <name.com> names, even in
the political context, would be expected by Internet users to resolve to officially
sanctioned websites, and that any other use of those names is misleading. Could a
personality rights model resolve this dilemma? For one thing, it would obviously protect
any politician’s or public figure’s identity regardless of a trademark interest. However, it
would only protect them from unauthorized commercial conduct and not necessarily
against undesired critical commentary. Thus, like with the previous case study, if the
defendant’s conduct was purely expressive, rather than commercial, the right of publicity
may not provide results any different to those currently provided under trademark
focused rules.
Again, if the defendant’s conduct did contain commercial elements – either
because the Internet is regarded as a global commercial communications medium,269 or
because the website engages in some kind of commerce such as advertising books that
criticize the politician270 – then the politician might have more luck. As a general matter,
267

See, for example, Cal. Business and Professions Code, §§ 17526(a) (relating to trademark rights in
a given domain name); 17526(c) (use of domain name in relation to the bona fide offering of goods or
services); see discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com? Political Speech and the First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008).
268

Cal. Business and Professions Code, § 17526(j) (providing as a bad faith factor “The intent of a
person alleged to be in violation of this article to mislead, deceive, or defraud voters.”)

269

Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, page 11 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (“Internet users constitute a national, even international, audience, who must use interstate telephone
lines to access defendant's web site on the Internet. The nature of the Internet indicates that establishing a
typical home page on the Internet, for access to all users, would satisfy the Lanham Act's "in commerce"
requirement.”). See also American Libraries Association v Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“In addition, many of those users who are communicating for private, noncommercial purposes are
nonetheless participants in interstate commerce by virtue of their Internet consumption. Many users obtain
access to the Internet by means of an on-line service provider, such as America Online, which charges a fee
for its services. "Internet service providers," including plaintiffs Panix, Echo, and NYC NET, also offer
Internet access for a monthly or hourly fee. Patrons of storefront "computer coffee shops," such as New
York's own CyberCafe, similarly pay for their access to the Internet, in addition to partaking of food and
beverages sold by the cafe. Dial-in bulletin board systems often charge a fee for access.”)
270

See, for example, Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F 3d 309 (2005) (gripesite contained links to
amazon.com webpage selling a book critical of the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s views on homosexuality).
However, note that in this case, the plaintiff was unsuccessful in establishing any form of trademark
infringement or dilution despite this conduct of the plaintiff. This factor was more successful in the
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unauthorized commercial use may be more difficult to establish in the case of a political
commentary website than an unauthorized fan website. This is because the iterations of
unauthorized fan conduct are more likely to have a commercial aspect in practice than a
pure political commentary website. Celebrities names are more likely to attract online
customers than political names and may thus be more desirable to those seeking to make
commercial profits from use of corresponding domain names.271
Overall, a personality rights based framework for personal domain name disputes
that allowed unauthorized expressive uses of <name.com> names, while prohibiting
unauthorized commercial uses, might achieve a better theoretical focus than the current
UDRP. It would remove the requirement for a complainant to establish trademark rights
in her personal name, or to establish cybersquatting, as opposed to other kinds of
commercial profit motives by the registrant. At the same time, it would not unduly chill
speech because it would preserve the right to engage in purely expressive conduct about
an individual, and, if limited in the first instance to <name.com> names, would preserve
other iterations of a relevant name in the domain space for both expressive and
commercial conduct. To some extent, these results are similar to those currently found in
practice in some trademark-based litigation. However, the use of a personality rights
model would lead to greater consistency on the question of what is being protected (a
name rather than a mark), and why (because we care about both the personhood and
proprietary aspects of an individual’s persona).272
trademark context in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v Doughney, 113 F Supp 2d 915 (2000);
aff’d 263 F.3d 359 (2001) (parody site linking to websites where fur and animal products antithetical to
plaintiff’s views were available for sale).
271

An obvious example is found in Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5
July, 2006, ¶ 4 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html)
(respondent had used tomcruise.com domain name to draw custom to a website that advertised products
and services unrelated to the well-known actor Tom Cruise).
272

On theories of the right of publicity with a focus on personhood and individual autonomy, see
Haemmerli, supra note ___. On the property theory basis for the right of publicity, see Dogan and Lemley,
Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for
personality rights as property); McKenna, supra note ___, 247 (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently
similar to other objects the law regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the
traditional bundle of property rights. But far too few courts and commentators have offered a theory as to
why any of the traditional property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of Lockean
labor theory justifications for property rights in personal identity); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The
Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 343, 388 (“Both proponents and critics of the right of
publicity generally perceive it as a property claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8 (1999)
(noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that
commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to do so within this property context, and to
use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of a property right in identity or persona.”);
Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“This Article … contends that a property-based conception for publicity
rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our theoretical conceptions of property.”);
David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71
(2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Rielly, supra note __, 1165-9 (describing
development of a property rights rationale for the right of publicity). See also Diane Zimmerman and
Melissa Jacoby, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322 (2002).
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III. CRAFTING A NEW PERSONAL DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION
POLICY (“PDRP”)
A. BASIC STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF A PDRP
Obviously, the right of publicity can be applied to some personal domain name
cases now.273 Even after the implementation of a new PDRP, this would continue to be
the case, as contractual arbitration procedures will not oust the jurisdiction of domestic
courts.274 Thus, even if a PDRP was limited to <name.com> disputes, conflicts about
personal domain names in other domain spaces could arguably be litigated under right of
publicity laws in relevant jurisdictions.275 The main problem with the right of publicity in
domestic law is that it raises jurisdictional and cost problems that are largely avoided or
minimized by using an inexpensive and efficient online dispute resolution procedure.
Thus, merging the substance of the right of publicity with the procedural advantages of
the UDRP in a new PDRP would be a useful innovation in domain name dispute
resolution policy and practice.
This article has suggested that most relevant disputes arise in <name.com>
cases,276 and that initially a new PDRP should be limited to these cases until a clearer

273

It has, in fact, been argued in several domain name cases involving personal domain names to
date: Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (in which a right of publicity
claim was made, amongst other unfair competition claims, in a dispute involving a domain name
corresponding with the plaintiff’s personal name); Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16024 (2002) (plaintiff brought a claim under § 17525 of the Californian Business and Professions
Code, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as it protects personal names
in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses).
274

This is expressly recognized currently in paragraph 4(k) of the UDRP: “The mandatory
administrative proceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph 4 shall not prevent either you or the
complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution
before such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is concluded.”
275

And of course <name.com> disputes could be litigated in domestic courts under right of publicity
laws as well.
276

See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May,
2000 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving
juliaroberts.com domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006
(available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving
tomcruise.com domain name); Kevin Spacey v Alberta Hot Rods, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
114437, August 1, 2002 (available at http://www.arb-forum.com/domains/decisions/114437.htm)
(involving the domain name kevinspacey.com); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No.
FA0312000220007, National Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at:
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm) (involving annanicolesmith.com domain name);
Bjorn Borg v Miguel Garcia, WIPO Case No. D2007-0591, June 21, 2007 (available at:
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2007/d2007-0591.html ) (involving the domain name
bjornborg.com); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National Arbitration Forum Claim No
FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce
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jurisprudence about the protection of personas in cyberspace emerges. This approach
also goes some way towards alleviating concerns about the potential chilling effect on
free speech of any new procedure for personal domain name dispute resolution. There
may be some question as to whether a PDRP should automatically apply to registrations
in the newer <.name> gTLD, although there are already other protections for that gTLD
that might assist people in the protection of their personal names there.277 Thus, a new
PDRP should, at least initially, only be incorporated by reference into domain name
registration agreements for <.com> domain names. It could later be extended or
modified if the need arose.
A new PDRP could be drafted in terms very similar to the UDRP. It could adopt
the UDRP’s basic structure and general terms, including representations and warranties
made by the registrant,278 orders that could be made by arbitrators,279 and procedural
matters such as how to lodge communications relating to a dispute.280 As with the UDRP,
a person who has registered a <name.com> domain name281 would be required to submit
to a mandatory arbitration proceeding if a complainant with the relevant personal name
established the matters set forth in the policy. Again, as with the UDRP, an
administrative proceeding under the PDRP would not prevent either party from taking the
dispute to a relevant court.282 The idea would be to streamline disputes in a more
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html).
277

Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting: supra note ___, at 1420-1421 (describing domain
name “watch” service and “defensive registration” service; the former allows individuals to be notified if
anyone else attempts to register a given domain name without having to register it herself, while the latter
allows a person with a legitimate interest in a domain name to register it without having to actively use it in
order to maintain the registration).
278

UDRP, para. 2 (“By applying to register a domain name, or by asking us to maintain or renew a
domain name registration, you hereby represent and warrant to us that (a) the statements that you made in
your Registration Agreement are complete and accurate; (b) to your knowledge, the registration of the
domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) you are not
registering the domain name for an unlawful purpose; and (d) you will not knowingly use the domain name
in violation of any applicable laws or regulations. It is your responsibility to determine whether your
domain name registration infringes or violates someone else's rights.”)
279

UDRP, para. 4(i) (“The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding before an
Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain name or the transfer of
your domain name registration to the complainant.”). For a more detailed discussion of proposed PDRP
remedies, see Part III.D infra.
280

See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, available at
http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules-24oct99.htm , last viewed on November 23, 2007.
281

And perhaps ultimately some other iterations of the name if there was ever a need to extend the
policy more broadly.
282

UDRP, para 4(k) (“The mandatory administrative proceeding requirements set forth in Paragraph
4 shall not prevent either you or the complainant from submitting the dispute to a court of competent
jurisdiction for independent resolution before such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or
after such proceeding is concluded. If an Administrative Panel decides that your domain name registration
should be canceled or transferred, we will wait ten (10) business days (as observed in the location of our
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accessible forum than is currently available in court proceedings due to cost and
jurisdiction issues. The new PDRP may also fill some gaps in the legal systems of some
jurisdictions that do not have specific protections for personal names or identities outside
of trademark law.283

B. THE BASIS OF A PDRP COMPLAINT
To establish a complaint under the new PDRP, a complainant should be required
to establish that: (a) the registrant’s domain name corresponds letter for letter with the
complainant’s personal name, (b) the registrant has no legitimate interests in the domain
name, and (c) the registrant has registered or used the name for an unauthorized
commercial purpose. This would be the PDRP analog to clause 4(a) of the UDRP.284
Rather than establishing a trademark interest, the complainant would only have to
establish what her own name is – this should be easier than establishing a trademark right
in a personal name for obvious reasons. The provision should cover a complainant’s
actual personal name, as well as a name she is commonly known by. Thus, it would
cover “Cher” for “Cheryl Sarkisian LaPiere” and “Madonna” for “Madonna Louise
Veronica Ciccone”.285 It could also potentially cover “Tyra” for “Tyra Banks” and
“Trump” for “Donald Trump”.286

principal office) after we are informed by the applicable Provider of the Administrative Panel's decision
before implementing that decision. We will then implement the decision unless we have received from you
during that ten (10) business day period official documentation (such as a copy of a complaint, file-stamped
by the clerk of the court) that you have commenced a lawsuit against the complainant in a jurisdiction to
which the complainant has submitted under Paragraph 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure. (In general, that
jurisdiction is either the location of our principal office or of your address as shown in our Whois database.
See Paragraphs 1 and 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of Procedure for details.) If we receive such documentation
within the ten (10) business day period, we will not implement the Administrative Panel's decision, and we
will take no further action, until we receive (i) evidence satisfactory to us of a resolution between the
parties; (ii) evidence satisfactory to us that your lawsuit has been dismissed or withdrawn; or (iii) a copy of
an order from such court dismissing your lawsuit or ordering that you do not have the right to continue to
use your domain name.”)
283

The United States is the only country that has created a specific right of publicity tort. Other
jurisdictions may protect similar rights in other ways: for example, Trade Practices Act, § 52 in Australia
(prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct in commerce). In the United Kingdom, privacy laws have
been utilized to create a right similar to the right of publicity in practice: see, for example, Douglas and
others v Hello! Ltd, [2001] 2 All ER 289; [2001] 1 FLR 982, [2002] 1 FCR 289 (U.K.) (concerned with
compensation for unauthorized publication of photographs of the Michael Douglas/Catherine Zeta-Jones
wedding under on a privacy basis in the absence of a right of publicity in the United Kingdom). Note also
that not all states within the United States recognize the right of publicity so the adoption of a PDRP would
also help with otherwise potentially problematic conflicts issues between state laws.
284

UDRP, para. 4(a) (requiring a domain name registrant to submit to mandatory arbitration under
the UDRP when: (i) the registrant’s domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or
service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests
in respect of the domain name; and (iii) the registrant’s domain name has been registered and is being used
in bad faith.”)
285

This would accord with the way in which the right of publicity currently works. See, for example,
Indiana Code Title 32 (Property), Art. 36 (Publicity), Chap. 1 (Rights of Publicity), § 32-36-1-3 (defining
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The requirement to show that the registrant has no legitimate interests in the
domain name would be necessary to cover cases where, for example, the registrant
happens to have the same personal name as a complainant. In cases of competing
legitimate interests in the same name, probably a “first come, first served” rule, subject to
private negotiation between the parties, is preferable to a dispute resolution mechanism in
which the arbitrators have little to go on as to who has the best interest in a given domain
name. This accords with the way the UDRP works in the case of competing legitimate
trademark interests.287 It may be that ultimately domain name sharing arrangements
could be developed for such situations either by private agreement between parties or
facilitated through a body such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (“ICANN”).288
There is a possibility that a domain name registrant might change her personal
name to match that of a given individual purely in order to register a relevant domain
name. This would be the analog to a domain name registrant who registers a trademark
she never intends to use in order to clothe herself with a “legitimate interest” in a
corresponding domain name in order to engage in abusive conduct with respect to the
name. An obvious example arose in the <madonna.com> dispute where the initial
registrant of that domain name was obviously a cybersquatter and had registered a
“Madonna” trademark in Tunisia in order to argue that he had a legitimate trademark

“name” for the purposes of the statute as including “the actual or assumed name of a living or deceasd
natural person that is intended to identify the person”).
286

It may or may not cover intentional misspellings of complainants’ names such as “Tom Kruse” for
“Tom Cruise”. See, for example, Lamparello v Falwell, 420 F 3d 309 (2005) (involving an intentional
misspelling of the Reverend Falwell’s name as a domain name). However, perhaps such names should not
be covered in the first instance of the policy in the interests of avoiding the chilling of speech. This may be
a little like the “look-a-like” and “sound-a-like” cases under the right of publicity in the “real world” which
have been criticized for extending the right too far. See, for example, William Heberer, The
Overprotection of Celebrity: A Comment on White vs Samsung Electronics America Inc, 22 HOFSTRA L
REV 729 (1994); Steven Clay, Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and
Federal Courts, 79 MINN L REV 485 (1994).
287

See discussion in A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube? Corresponding Trademarks and
Domain Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008).

288

ICANN is the body that manages the Internet domain name system: see www.icann.org, last
viewed on November 23, 2007. The author has canvassed the possibility of domain name sharing
previously in the trademark context, and the mechanics of such arrangements for personal names would
work similarly, so domain sharing strategies for personal names are not discussed further here. See
Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube? Corresponding Trademarks and Domain
Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008).
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interest in the domain name.289 The name was transferred to the popular singer Madonna
who herself had registered American trademark interests in the name.290
It could be that the incorporation of a “bad faith” element in the PDRP would be
useful to prevent such conduct. However, this leaves open the door for arbitrators to
interpret that element in line with trademark based laws involving Internet domain
names.291 This would not necessarily be a major problem, although it might fail to catch
conduct under the new policy that ought to be prohibited under a personality rights
framework. An unauthorized fan website, for example, may not be in “bad faith” in the
trademark sense, but perhaps should be prohibited under the new policy if it was creating
a commercial gain in the hands of the registrant by using the complainant’s name in an
unauthorized manner. Thus, it would be better not to require a showing of bad faith in
the PDRP, and wait and see how many situations arise where a person is prepared to go
to the lengths of changing her name in order to register a domain name corresponding
with someone else’s name. In actual fact, many people who speculatively register
domain names corresponding with the names of well known persons register multiple
names292 and would obviously not be able to change their own personal name to all of
those names. They could attempt to register trademarks relating to a large group of
personal names, but these trademarks would be subject to invalidation if they are not
being used in conjunction with the sale of goods or services as required by trademark
law.293
289

Madonna Ciccone, p/k/a Madonna v. Dan Parisi and "Madonna.com", WIPO Case No. D20000847, October 12, 200 (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20000847.html, last viewed on November 23, 2007).
290

id.

291

For example, both ACPA and the UDRP infringements rest on bad faith conduct on the part of the
domain name registrant: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(d)(1), 1129(1), UDRP, para. 4(a)(3), 4(b).
292

Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000, WIPO Arbitration and
Mediation Center, para. 4 (full text available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html , last viewed on November 6,
2007)(“ The Respondent has also registered over fifty (50) other domain names, including names
incorporating other movie stars names within <madeleinestowe.com> and <alpacino.com> and a famous
Russian gymnast’s name within <elenaprodunova.com>.”); Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce
Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No. D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001, para 5 (available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html) (“Mr Burgar is the owner of around
1,500 names, and that many of those names, including the domain name at issue, take the internet user to
his own site, "celebrity1000.com". They therefore point to the fact that this constitutes bad faith under
paragraphs 4(b)(ii) and (iv) of the UDRP”).
293

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 1.03[7][c] (describing the trademark “use” requirement). On
trademark use, see also Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in
Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L REV 1597, 1629-1638 (2007); Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley, Grounding
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L REV 1669, 1690-1698 (2007). In situations involving
an individual registrant’s name that happens coincidentally to correspond with a famous person’s name,
there may be some problems. If such a person uses a domain name that incidentally corresponds with the
name of a famous person and makes a commercial profit from doing so, should that conduct be prohibited
under the new policy? In terms of its affect on Internet users, they probably are attracted to the website by
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With respect to the unauthorized commercial use requirement, the PDRP could
give examples of such uses or could leave the wording vague and allow arbitrators over
time to determine what constitutes an unauthorized commercial use on a case by case
basis. If the PDRP were to be drafted more comprehensively to include examples of
unauthorized commercial use, these could be taken from current right of publicity
statutes. For example, the Indiana statute294 defines “commercial purpose” in the context
of the right of publicity as: “the use of an aspect of a personality’s right of publicity …
(1) On or in connection with a product, merchandise, goods, services, or commercial
activities. (2) For advertising or soliciting purchases of products, merchandise, goods,
services, or for promoting commercial activities. (3) For the purpose of fundraising.”295
The incorporation of such a definition would give arbitrators some clear guidance in
applying the PDRP to the registrant’s activities, and may be helpful at least in the early
days of such a dispute resolution policy. It would also allow disputing parties to draw to
some extent on existing personality rights jurisprudence to help inform initial
determinations under the PDRP. Although this test does reflect some concepts
traditionally associated with trademark law, it is somewhat broader with its inclusion of
uses such as the promotion of commercial activities for fundraising purposes.

C. THE “LEGITIMATE INTEREST” DEFENSE UNDER THE PDRP
It may be a good idea for the PDRP to include a defense such as that found in
clause 4(c) of the UDRP to give the registrant some guidance on how to establish a
legitimate interest in a given domain name. The indicia of a legitimate interest in the
UDRP largely relate to good faith uses of the domain name in commerce in connection
with the registrant’s own commercial or non-commercial endeavors.296 Any legitimate
interest provision included in a new PDRP would have to be drafted differently because
the connection with the famous name and then may avail themselves of some unrelated information or
commercial activity as a result. This sounds like the kind of thing covered by the right of publicity even
though the result may be incidental due to the similarity of two people’s names. Perhaps the PDRP would
require a special provision to deal with these unusual cases, leaving some discretion to arbitrators to decide
who has the better interest in the name in any given case. However, such a provision may be very difficult
to draft. Alternatively, these matters might ultimately be resolved by courts applying right of publicity
principles or other tort principles relating to unfair competition: GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 7.01
(on federal unfair competition law).
294

Indiana Code Title 32 (Property), Art. 36 (Publicity), Chap. 1 (Rights of Publicity).

295

id., § 32-26-1-2.

296

UDRP, para. 4(c) which gives examples of legitimate use as including the registrant’s ability to
establish that: “(i) before any notice to [the registrant] of the dispute, [the registrant’s] use of, or
demonstrable preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in
connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; or (ii) [the registrant] (as an individual, business,
or other organization) [has] been commonly known by the domain name, even if [she has] acquired no
trademark or service mark rights; or (iii) [the registrant is] making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use
of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the
trademark or service mark at issue.”
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the policy would actually prohibit some unauthorized commercial uses even if they are
associated with a bona fide business plan of the registrant. The UDRP, for example,
currently excuses as a legitimate use a registrant’s use, or demonstrable preparation to
use, a relevant domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or
services.297 This makes sense in a trademark-based system because it amounts to two
competing legitimate interests in using the mark in a domain name presumably in
different areas of commerce.298 For example, if the complainant has registered the
trademark “Hypo” for medical syringes and I have registered the domain name
<hypo.com> for a business involving the sale of practice law exam questions, and I have
registered the domain name in good faith for these purposes, I should be entitled to use
it.299
However, comparing this to the proposed PDRP, if the policy behind the right of
publicity is to prevent anyone from making any kind of unjust profit out of another
person’s name or likeness, the PDRP should not permit a domain name registrant to
register another person’s name as a domain name even for some bona fide offerings of
goods or services. In any event, it is difficult to think of a situation in which a registrant
would register someone else’s name as a domain name with such an intent. Why would
anyone register, say, <tomcruise.com> for the sale of goods or services completely
unrelated to Tom Cruise unless they wanted to use the name to attract attention to their

297

UDRP, para. 4(c)(i).

298

The issues arising in relation to two competing trademark interests with one corresponding domain
name are taken up in more detail in Jacqueline Lipton, A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube?
Corresponding Trademarks and Domain Name Sharing, (forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND
TECHNOLOGY, 2008).
299

If such a case was brought under domestic trademark law, I may have some difficulties under the
“initial interest confusion” doctrine. The medical supply company might argue in a court proceeding for
trademark infringement that, even though consumers are not confused about the source of the products
when they get to my website, I am potentially diverting custom from them by attracting consumers to my
website by using a similar online address. It may be that consumers who assume that <hypo.com> is the
website of the medical supply company would accidentally access my website and then cease looking for
the other company on the basis that it is too difficult to find. Regardless of what view a court would take of
this argument under domestic trademark law, the UDRP currently has no “initial interest confusion”
doctrine built into it in this sense and seems to allow as a defense that the registrant was using, or planning
to use, the relevant domain name in a bona fide trademark manner. On the initial interest doctrine in
trademark law generally, see Lastowka, supra note ___, 35-36 (“With respect to search engines … a …
significant expansion of trademark law is the doctrine of initial interest confusion. Traditionally, and not
surprisingly, most courts have focused analysis of consumer confusion on the time period proximate to
consumer purchases. The doctrine of initial interest confusion shifts the focus of confusion analysis to a
time prior to the time of purchase. Initial interest confusion can be found to exist even if that confusion
was not present at the time of purchase.”); see also Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing
at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L REV 105 (2005); Goldman, supra note ___, 559
(“[Initial interest confusion] lacks a rigorous definition, a clear policy justification, and a uniform standard
for analyzing claims. With its doctrinal flexibility, [it] has become the tool of choice for plaintiffs to shut
down junior users who have not actually engaged in misappropriative uses.”)
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own goods, services, or advertising?300 This would hardly be in good faith if we accept
that individuals have a right to prevent an unauthorized commercial profit being made
from their online persona in certain cases, such as with respect to <name.com> versions
of their personal names. Even if Tom Cruise himself has no intention of using
<tomcruise.com> to sell particular goods or services, the unauthorized registrant has
interfered with his ability to control his persona in commerce which may be prohibited
under a personality rights framework.
There may be conflicts between the UDRP and the new PDRP where a personal
name truly is a trademark, as when an individual runs a business under her own name. In
such a case, it is arguable that trademark-based laws should apply with respect to the
trademarked version of the name. Of course, this happens routinely in judicial
proceedings under trademark law. In such cases, courts have the power to determine
trademark-based claims and right of publicity claims in the alternative.301 It may be that
the new PDRP should include some provision for joining UDRP proceedings with PDRP
proceedings in such situations, allowing one arbitrator or panel to hear the entire dispute
and decide whether the name in question is really being used by the registrant in a
trademark sense or in a personal sense. If PDRP claims are to be at least initially limited
to <.com> registration agreements, a procedure for joining PDRP and UDRP disputes
would only have to be developed and incorporated into those agreements. There would
be no need to incorporate a joining procedure into other registration agreements, such as
<.net> and <.org> registrations, into which only the UDRP would be incorporated.
There may also be situations in which a domain name registrant simply happens
to have the same name as a complainant and has registered the domain name for her own
personal use: for example, to set up her own webpage. These situations may actually be
more difficult than they seem as a matter of policy. It may be that a complainant is
actually harmed in a right of publicity sense even where the registrant herself has a
legitimate interest in the name by virtue of having a similar name to the complainant. As
the right of publicity has no consumer confusion requirement, it may be that simply using
the complainant’s name in a domain name on a personal website might contravene the
right in some cases, particularly if the website contains some unrelated commercial
advertising. One way to deal with these situations would be to leave the “hard cases” to
the courts and hope for resolution that way. In terms of the drafting of the new PDRP,
though, it should suffice to excuse, as a legitimate interest, the conduct of a person who
has been commonly known by the relevant name and is only using the name for her own
personal website.

D. REMEDIES UNDER THE PDRP

300

This appears to have been the strategy utilized by the domain name registrant of tomcruise.com
under discussion in Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available
at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html).
301

See, for example, Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006); Rogers v
Grimaldi, 875 F 2d 994 (1988).
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Like, the UDRP, the PDRP would be limited in terms of possible remedies to a
cancellation or transfer order over the relevant domain name.302 Thus, a successful
complainant could either have the registration of the domain name cancelled altogether,
or could have the name transferred to her. In most personal domain name disputes under
the UDRP to date, the registrant has sought a transfer,303 even where she does not intend
to use the name herself, presumably in order to maintain control over the most intuitive
version of her online persona – the <name.com> version of her name.
Because of these limitations on remedies, the proposed PDRP may actually have
less of a potential chilling effect on online speech, if any, than the threat of litigation
under the right of publicity. Although the usual remedy in a right of publicity action is an
injunction,304 which, in the domain name case, may be tantamount to a cancellation or
transfer order under the PDRP, courts can award other remedies for infringement of
personality rights. These include damages based on injury to a plaintiff’s feelings,305
damages based on unjust enrichment,306 and accounts of profits.307 Additionally, even an
injunction may be tailored to a given case more broadly than a mere transfer or
cancellation order: for example, it may prohibit the defendant from engaging in any
commerce online utilizing the name or likeness of a plaintiff, regardless of the domain
name used by the defendant.
Given the broad range of potential remedies under the right of publicity, a domain
name registrant may be more deterred from engaging in unauthorized online use of a
personal domain name than she would be if most personal domain name disputes were
arbitrated under a PDRP. One might argue that the threat of personality rights litigation
is available for personal domain name disputes today, and it does not appear to be
chilling online conduct involving unauthorized uses of individual’s names in the <.com>
domain space. However, this may be a temporary situation. If, for example, the trend in
UDRP arbitration changes, and UDRP arbitrators become less prepared to accept
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See UDRP, para. 4(i) (“The remedies available to a complainant pursuant to any proceeding
before an Administrative Panel shall be limited to requiring the cancellation of your domain name or the
transfer of your domain name registration to the complainant.”)
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See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd Case No. D2000-0210 , May 29, 2000,
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (full text available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html , last viewed on November 6,
2007); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html).
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trademark rights in individual’s names, then right of publicity litigation may become a
much more realistic prospect. It may in fact be the case that right of publicity actions
have not been brought more often in domain name disputes simply because many people
have not thought of it yet. It is possible that such actions will become more common in
the future. There have already been some right of publicity actions involving personal
domain names in recent years.308
If right of publicity disputes gain popularity in the personal domain name context,
the development of a PDRP would be a welcome addition for both complainants and
domain name registrants. It would be quicker, easier and cheaper for both parties. It
would also provide the most appropriate remedy in such cases – a transfer or cancellation
order - and may deter complainants from seeking additional remedies in judicial
proceedings. If the cost is significantly less to a complainant, but the remedy is limited,
the complainant may still prefer this course of action than more time consuming and
costly litigation, despite the fact that litigation may provide more valuable and varied
remedies. This move towards arbitration with its more limited remedies may thus create
less of a chilling effect on online speech than would personality rights litigation.

E. POLITICIANS’ NAMES: A SPECIAL CASE?
As noted in Part II.B.3, the names of politicians in the domain space, particularly
in the lead-up to an election, may pose special problems. Where a registrant has taken a
politician’s name and registered it as a domain name for purely expressive purposes,
there are obvious First Amendment arguments that this conduct should not be proscribed.
Speech critical of politicians and their policies is an essential aspect of a representative
democracy.309 However, it is also important that Internet users are not misled about the
authorized web presence of a given politician. The question is: What is the correct
presumption here? Should there be a presumption that all <name.com> domain names
automatically belong to the relevant politician, so that others wishing to comment on
them are to be relegated to “lesser” domain spaces such as <name.net>, or
<namesucks.com>? Or are we better off with no such presumption and a “first come,
first served” system in which even a critic of a politician is entitled to the <name.com>
version of the name if she registers it first?
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See, for example, Kevin Trudeau v George Lanoue, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7956 (2006) (in which
a right of publicity claim was made, amongst other unfair competition claims, in a dispute involving a
domain name corresponding with the plaintiff’s personal name); Paul Wright v Domain Source Inc., 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16024 (2002) (plaintiff brought a claim under § 17525 of the Californian Business and
Professions Code, which is a cyberspace analog to right of publicity law in some respects as it protects
personal names in the domain space against certain unauthorized uses).
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See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com? Political Speech and the First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008); Matthew Coleman, Domain Name
Piracy and Privacy: Do Federal Election Regulations Offer a Solution?, 19 YALE L & POL’Y REV 235,
263 (2000) (“[W]idespread use of a new and inexpensive communications medium has the potential to lead
to unprecedented citizen participation in politics…”).
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Any personality rights framework for dispute resolution will only assist
individuals, including politicians, against unauthorized commercial conduct.310 Thus,
where the conduct complained of is purely expressive with no commercial elements, the
right of publicity will not assist the politician. On this view, a PDRP based on the right
of publicity should also not assist the politician, unless all conduct on the Internet is
regarded as “commercial”311 - which may well not be an accurate reflection of the law.312
If the view is taken that a personality rights based PDRP only prohibits commercial
conduct, then some conduct involving a <name.com> version of politician’s name will be
prohibited and other conduct will not.
The example of the <kerryedwards.com> domain name from the 2004 American
presidential election, for example, may have been a candidate for protection under a
PDRP as suggested here. An individual called Mr Kerry Edwards did have a legitimate
interest in the name in the sense that it was his personal name. However, he was also
using the name for a commercial purpose during the electoral race by attempting to
auction it to the highest bidder.313 An arbitrator under the PDRP would have needed to
decide whether Mr Kerry Edwards’ legitimate interest in his personal name outweighed
his conduct that clearly sought to profit from Senator John Kerry’s and Senator John
Edward’s respective names. In actual fact, it is likely that Senators Kerry and Edwards
would have had no luck even under the PDRP contemplated in this Article. For one
thing, Mr Kerry Edwards did have a legitimate interest in the name by virtue of his
personal name, and for another thing, <kerryedwards.com> does not correspond letter for
letter with the name of either senator. It is assumed here that, at least initially, the PDRP
should be narrowly confined to names that exactly match a complainant’s personal name
in the <.com> space to avoid chilling effects on speech. If the facts were different and
310

GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 2.16[1] (“The right of publicity … is the right of an
individual to control the commercial use of his or her name, likeness, signature, or other personal
characteristics.”)
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As was suggested, at least with respect to the Lanham Act’s “in commerce” requirement in
Planned Parenthood Federation of America Inc v Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1430, page 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
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Lastowka, supra note ___, at 64 (“[I]t is not clear how Bucci had used the Planned Parenthood
mark in commerce, given that he lacked any product or service. Those who advocate for an expansion of
trademark use often criticize Bucci for this reason.”)
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See discussion in Jacqueline Lipton, Who Owns Hillary.com? Political Speech and the First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55, 64-65 (2008).
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the name in question was <johnkerry.com>, a registrant attempting to auction the name
for profit may well have lost a PDRP proceeding.
If as a matter of policy there is a presumption that the <name.com> version of a
politician’s name should rightfully belong to the politician whatever the circumstances,
particularly in the electoral context, then the PDRP would need to reflect that. It may be
that there would need to be a special provision limited to politicians’ names in the
electoral context stating that the politician has the right to that name without having to
establish anything other than that she is running for office and the domain name in
question corresponds letter for letter with her personal name in the <.com> domain space.
It may be that there should be no legitimate interest defenses for registrants in these
cases, and that perhaps a temporary licensing scheme314 needs to be set up to allow
politicians to use (or share)315 the relevant domain name during the course of the
campaign where a prior registrant has a legitimate claim to the name. This may be
difficult to draft and may not be worth the effort, given that politicians may prefer to
attempt private negotiations with registrants in order to avoid unnecessary negative
publicity.316 Presumably, over time, politicians are becoming more savvy about
protecting their names in the domain space and the need for such interventions may not
be necessary going forwards.
There may also be First Amendment difficulties implementing a scheme
prioritizing <name.com> domain names for politicians with corresponding names against
all unauthorized uses, whether purely expressive or commercial, or both.317 Even though
the PDRP would effectively be a private system and not Congressional action, it may still
incidentally attract First Amendment checks and balances if ICANN, the body adopting
the procedure, was regarded as a governmental, or governmentally-controlled,
organization.318
In any event, during the initial phases of the operation of a new PDRP, there are
good arguments for putting aside any specific plans to protect politician’s names in the
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Jacqueline Lipton, Beyond Cybersquatting, supra note ___, at 1433-1435 (suggesting a temporary
compulsory licensing scheme for these situations).
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On the attributes of a potential domain name sharing system, see discussion in Jacqueline Lipton,
A Winning Solution for Youtube and Utube? Corresponding Trademarks and Domain Name Sharing,
(forthcoming, HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, 2008).
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for ease of reference.
317
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the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 49 BOSTON COLLEGE L REV 55 (2008).
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There have certainly been cases in the past where publicly funded bodies have been subject to
First Amendment constraints. See, for example, United States v American Library Association, 539 U.S.
194 (2003); Mainstream Loudoun v Board of Trustees of the Loudoun Co. Library, 2 F Supp 2d 783 (E.D.
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domain space that do not accord with personality rights principles. A rule that
<name.com> versions of a politician’s name automatically belong to a politician against
all comers may not be an accurate reflection of these principles, or perhaps even of
current social norms. This may differ from celebrity domain names in the sense that
unauthorized registrants of <name.com> versions of celebrities’ names in the domain
space are perhaps more likely to be seeking commercial profit than registrants of
politicians’ names. In cases where an unauthorized use of a politician’s name in a
<name.com> domain is commercial, the PDRP would cover this without the need for any
special provisions relating to politicians’ names. Certainly, the PDRP as contemplated
here would prevent political cybersquatting: that is, registration of a politician’s name as
a domain name with the intent to sell it for a profit.319 It may simply not cover registrants
with purely expressive motives. Politicians may also become more careful about their
names in the domain space over time, and they may become better at negotiating with
those who have registered their domain names before them. If, after some years of
operation of the PDRP, a need is perceived to do something more specifically directed at
creating clearer rules or presumptions for political domain names, such rights could be
added to the PDRP at a later date.

F. DURATION AND DESCENDABILITY OF PERSONAL NAME RIGHTS
UNDER THE PDRP
One contentious issue that arises under personality rights theory relates to the
duration of those rights.320 Related questions are whether the rights are transferable or
descendable.321 The PDRP as contemplated in this Article has presumed protection for a
personal domain name during the course of the relevant person’s lifetime and has not
focused on issues of transferability or descendability. This is implicit in the suggestion
that the PDRP should require the complainant to establish that the domain name in
question corresponds letter for letter with her personal name. Once she is deceased, she
can no longer establish this. Her estate may be able to establish that the name
corresponds with her name, but that is not the intent of the PDRP as crafted here. The
idea here has been to protect individuals against unauthorized commercial conduct with
respect to their names in a domain space where perhaps an individual has not thought to
register the name herself, but the public might expect her to have done so. In this sense,
the rights as contemplated here spring more from personhood than from property
theory.322
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As would 15 U.S.C. § 1129(1)(A), although this has the time and cost disadvantages associated
with any litigation.
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In particular, there has been some disagreement as to whether personality rights should survive a
person’s death: GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, § 2.16[4] (“There is sharp disagreement among the
courts, and even within some courts, as to whether the right of publicity is inheritable or whether it dies
with the individual.”) See also Kwall, First Amendment, supra note ___, 81-86.
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id. See also GILSON LALONDE, supra note ___, at § 2.16[5] (acknowledging that the right of
publicity may be sold and assigned).
322
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If, for example, I enter <tomcruise.com> into my web browser, I might expect to
find the authorized Tom Cruise website or no content at all if Mr Cruise has not
established an authorized website. However, if I were to enter the name of a deceased
famous person into a web browser, such as <marlonbrando.com>, would I necessarily
assume that this was an authorized website for Mr Brando? Or would I rather assume
that, after his death, his estate has little interest in maintaining such a website? In actual
fact, the <marlonbrando.com> domain name, along with domain names corresponding to
a number of other famous deceased persons, are used for “official” websites managed by
assignees of intellectual property rights in those people’s names.323 However, by way of
contrast, a UDRP dispute involving Albert Einstein’s name was decided against
Einstein’s estate.324 The decision was made largely on the grounds that an Internet user
would not necessarily expect the domain name <alberteinstein.com> to resolve to a
website actually run by Einstein’s estate such a lengthy period after his death.325

Right of Publicity, supra note ___, 1181-1183 (critique of Lockean labor theory justifications for
personality rights as property); McKenna, supra note ___, 247 (“It might be true that identity is sufficiently
similar to other objects the law regards as property and therefore deserves at least some of the sticks in the
traditional bundle of property rights. But far too few courts and commentators have offered a theory as to
why any of the traditional property justifications lead to that conclusion.”); 251-267 (critique of Lockean
labor theory justifications for property rights in personal identity); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The
Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L J 343, 388 (“Both proponents and critics of the right of
publicity generally perceive it as a property claim grounded in Lockean labor theory.”), 407-8 (1999)
(noting dual property and privacy justifications for right of publicity actions), 412 (“To the extent that
commentators specifically address publicity rights, they tend to do so within this property context, and to
use Lockean labor theories of property to explain the assertion of a property right in identity or persona.”);
Kwall, Fame, supra note ___, 15 (“This Article … contends that a property-based conception for publicity
rights is the natural outgrowth of our cultural norms as well as our theoretical conceptions of property.”);
David Westfall and David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT LJ 71
(2005) (examining property basis for rights of publicity); Rielly, supra note __, 1165-9 (describing
development of a property rights rationale for the right of publicity). See also Diane Zimmerman and
Melissa Jacoby, Foreclosing on Fame: Exploring the Uncharted Boundaries of the Right Of Publicity, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322 (2002).
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The Hebrew University of Jerusalem v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2002-0616, October
7, 2002, (available at http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0616.html)
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id, para (b)(III) (“There is a significant difference between the expectations of Internauts entering
a domain name of a celebrity (alive or dead) who is (or was) famously associated in commerce with the
supply of goods or services, on the one hand, and their expectations entering a domain name of a celebrity
long since dead who was not so associated, on the other. The former expect to find a site offering goods or
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with Complainant because Complainant has not established that it has any common law trademark rights.”)

73

CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE
What explains the differences here? Obviously, the estates of some famous
people have been extremely vigilant about protecting all relevant intellectual property
rights, including personality rights.326 If estates – or transferees – of intellectual property
rights pertaining to famous people are vigilant about those rights and ensure registration
of relevant domain names before anyone else has done so, there is no problem. There is
no need for a PDRP to operate here because estates of famous people that are aggressive
about protecting relevant rights will already have registered important domain names.
This may explain why Einstein’s estate lost its arbitration. Perhaps the combination of
the period of time since Einstein’s death and the fact that the estate had not been
sufficiently vigilant to register the domain name before anyone else were sufficient
factors to justify the result. On the other hand, given that the current registrants of
<einstein.com> and <alberteinstein.com> do not appear to be using the names for any
particular purpose,327 it is arguable that the names would be better utilized by Einstein’s
estate for information about Einstein and his life.
Given this possibility of wasteful uses of a deceased person’s name, and the fact
that personality rights are transferable in at least some jurisdictions,328 there is a plausible
argument that the PDRP should allow for assignees and beneficiaries of personality rights
to bring complaints in the name of the assignor or deceased person. If this were to be
done, the PDRP as contemplated above would have to be amended to allow a
complainant to show either that she has a personal name corresponding with the given
domain name or that she controls personality rights relating to a person with such a name.
This raises some practical difficulties, including the fact that if the beneficiary or
transferee of the deceased lives in a jurisdiction that has no personality rights laws, or has
personality rights laws that do not allow for transfer or descendability, there is little
plausible basis for bringing a PDRP complaint. In other words, the complainant would
not be able to show that she controlled the relevant personality rights.
Additionally, it may be difficult for arbitrators to determine the validity of a claim
that a complainant controls personality rights in another person’s name. It is a simple
enough task for arbitrators to accept evidence of what a complainant’s personal name
actually is under the PDRP as contemplated here. It may be more difficult for them to
evaluate evidence of claims about personality rights of deceased persons or persons who
have allegedly transferred personality rights to others. The PDRP procedure is intended
to achieve the same advantages in terms of time, cost, and procedural simplicity as the
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UDRP does for trademark-related claims. If arbitrators are asked to evaluate more
complex questions than simply what a person claims her name actually is, this could
interfere with the operation of the procedure in terms of time, cost and perhaps even
predictability of outcome. These might be good reasons to leave out matters relating to
transferability and descendability of personal rights in domain names until a later
iteration of the PDRP if the need arises.
Other arguments against the initial inclusion of a provision allowing assignees
and beneficiaries of personality rights to bring complaints under the PDRP include
concerns about how long a person’s image should be controlled by her estate after her
death.329 There may also be concerns that the transferability and descendability of rights
in a persona are not universally accepted even within the United States,330 so it may be a
mistake to foist them on a global system for protecting personal name interests in domain
names.331
Further, there may be some question as to how often these issues would arise in
practice in the domain name context. As noted above, the estates of many famous people
currently hold the domain names corresponding with the relevant names,332 while
celebrities and politicians are now getting better about aggressively fighting for control of
relevant domain names during their lifetimes.333 The result may be that the question of
post-mortem personal domain name disputes has very minimal practical importance. If a
PDRP is established now to help those who want to assert interests in relevant domain
names to obtain those names, those people can presumably hold on to the names and pass
them to their estates in the future as a matter of contract law. It is a simple matter for a
successful complainant to transfer the domain name to anyone she wants, either during
her lifetime or presumably post mortem if she executes the transfer formalities prior to
her death.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
This Article has identified why over-reliance on trademark-focused rules, such as
the UDRP, to resolve personal domain name disputes leads to inconsistent and arbitrary
results. It has suggested that a personality rights model would create a better substantive
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framework for dealing with these disputes. However, personality rights litigation suffers
from cost and procedural disadvantages. It is also exists today largely as a matter of
unharmonized state law within the United States. The aim of this Article has been to
suggest a new procedure for personal domain name disputes – a PDRP - that marries
together the procedural and globalization advantages of the UDRP with the substantive
theoretical advantages of the right of publicity. This approach achieves the best of both
worlds in that it maintains the procedural benefits of the UDRP – the avenue most often
chosen by complainants in personal domain name disputes today – while basing the
decisions on a theory that more appropriately protects interests in an individual’s persona
than trademark law.
Drafting and implementing a new PDRP would be a relatively easy and costeffective matter. It would require the drafting and adoption of such a procedure by
ICANN. Implementation would simply require the incorporation of the new PDRP by
reference into <.com> registration agreements in the first instance. The drafting of the
PDRP would generally mirror the drafting of the UDRP except for some changes in
substance to the text of UDRP’s clause 4 relating to the matters the claimant needs to
prove, and the nature and scope of the legitimate use defense available to the registrant.
The continued development of personal domain name jurisprudence based on
trademark principles threatens to warp the boundaries of trademark law and to
unjustifiably extend trademark practice online into areas where the alleged trademarks
are mere fictions. Alternatively, it could fail to protect interests that really should be
protected as a matter of tort law under the right of publicity.334 In any event, the
application of the trademark-based UDRP to personal domain name disputes is clearly
creating inconsistent results.335
334

See, for example, Bruce Springsteen v Jeff Burgar and Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No.
D2000-1532, Jan. 25, 2001 (available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d20001532.html) (involving brucespringsteen.com domain name); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim
Number FA0312000220007, Feb 21, 2004, National Arbitration Forum, full text available at
http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm, last viewed on October 25, 2007; The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No. D2002-0616, October 7, 2002, (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0616.html) (involving a complaint with
respect to the domain name <alberteinstein.com>).
335

Why, for example, should Julia Roberts and Tom Cruise be regarded as having trademark interests
in their personal names when the same is not necessarily true for Bruce Springsteen, or the late Anna
Nicole Smith? Why should “Hillary Clinton” be recognized as a trademark when the same is not true for
other politicians such as Kathleen Kennedy Townsend? See, for example, Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell
Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210, 30 May, 2000 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0210.html ) (involving juliaroberts.com
domain name); Tom Cruise v Alberta Hot Rods, WIPO Case No D2006-0560, 5 July, 2006 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2006/d2006-0560.html) (involving tomcruise.com
domain name); Anna Nicole Smith v DNS Research Inc, Claim No. FA0312000220007, National
Arbitration Forum, Feb 21, 2004 (available at: http://www.adrforum.com/domains/decisions/220007.htm)
(involving annanicolesmith.com domain name); Hillary Rodham Clinton v Michele Dinoia, National
Arbitration Forum Claim No FA0502000414641, March 18, 2005 (full text available at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/414641.htm) (involving hillaryclinton.com domain name); Bruce
Springsteen v Jeff Burgar, WIPO Case No D2000-1532, Jan 25, 2001 (available at

76

CELEBRITY IN CYBERSPACE
Another important advantage of a PDRP over the UDRP with respect to personal
domain name disputes is that it might refocus judicial attention on the appropriate legal
principles when these disputes do end up in court. While the trademark-focused UDRP
remains most people’s first port of call with respect to domain name disputes, litigation
also seems to be centered around the trademark-based provisions of domestic law. The
Falwell case,336 for example, was argued purely with respect to trademarks and did not
raise personality rights claims at all.337 The Kathleen Kennedy Townsend complaint338
would likely have been successful if it had been litigated under § 1129(1)(A) of the
Lanham Act, but was brought under the trademark-based UDRP instead.339 It may be
that if the cost-effective avenue of choice for complainants focuses on more appropriate
issues than trademark law, litigants would think to bring judicial proceedings under more
appropriate provisions of domestic law in the event that the dispute does end up in court.
This Article has demonstrated the importance of developing a mechanism
specifically and appropriately tailored for personal domain name disputes. This would be
a simple and easy task for ICANN in practice. If a PDRP could be adopted along the
lines described here, it might well result in a more effective resolution of domain name
disputes involving personal names. It might also assist more generally with appropriately
nuanced developments in cyberlaw, particularly pertaining to the protection of
personality rights online. Given that Internet regulators are constantly striving to balance
property and property-like rights online against free speech interests, the creation of more
sophisticated laws and regulations that more clearly define the scope of relevant interests
is of paramount importance. Trademark law in particular is currently under a lot of
pressure in cyberspace.340 If we are truly concerned about identifying the boundaries of
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-1532.html); Kathleen Kennedy Townsend
v Birt, WIPO Case No D2002-0030, April 11, 2002 (available at
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/html/2002/d2002-0030.html ).
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id. (“The Panel finds that the protection of an individual politician's name, no matter how famous,
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Second WIPO Report. This does not mean that Complainant is without remedy. The ACPA contains
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trademark law on the Internet, we must be prepared to address situations that do not
really involve trademarks by more targeted and effective means. Personality rights are a
more well-tailored and effective theoretical basis for resolving personal domain name
disputes, if we can avoid the current procedural and jurisdictional pitfalls. A new PDRP
as suggested in this Article could achieve this result in practice.
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